Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):443–459, 1982) where the workers’ reservation wage is the private information parameter critical for entry. We show that entry threat significantly distorts the wage, which in some cases adversely affects the firm’s ability to signal through price. Consequently, the separating equilibrium (in price) does not always exist. If, however, wage agreements are made public, signalling occurs with or without distortions in wage depending on whether the union’s bargaining power is high or low. Pooling equilibrium also exists and it features similar distortions. We also examine which signal, wage or price, generates greater social welfare. We would like to thank two referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is partially based on a chapter of Pal’s PhD thesis done at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India. For remaining errors we are solely responsible.     

成功应用CRM的三大法宝

现实中，人们常常会因为对现有系统的不满而考虑采用一个CRM系统，但根据一份从2000年以来的客户调查结果显示，超过80%的CRM系统最初都没有经过周密的组织部署，只有少数行业如零售、医药和航空例外。许多公司由于缺乏资金、组织或兴趣，不得不采用渐进式地，自下而上的“游击式”CRM系统（gCRM）。在未来的三年内，成功的CRM战略将克服组织、渠道、价值、产品和技术的障碍，成为极具价值的客户管理系统。但是，这将依赖于IT经理是否对将要进行的CRM项目做战略计划。这里将介绍几种方法来推动CRM项目——虽然目前还没有完美的方…     

The impact of group incentives on performance of small firms: Hausman–Taylor estimates

This paper investigates the impact of group incentives on firms' performance. It shows that group incentive raises firms' performance. This result empirically validates the implication of the theoretical literature that performance‐related pay can potentially improve firms' performance, in the context of a developing country, and indicates the importance of group incentives in small firms. It also shows that partnership firms perform better than private limited companies and labour unions have a negative impact on firms' performance. It employs the Hausman–Taylor random effects estimator in order to isolate the effects of time‐invariant covariates and also to tackle potential endogeneity problem. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Externalities,entry bias,and optimal subsidy policy for cleaner environment

This paper analyses alternative subsidy schemes and long-run entry bias in a new industry that creates positive environmental externalities (both generation externalities and externalities associated with interindustry technology spillovers). It demonstrates that per-unit subsidy scheme, despite attracting fewer firms, results in higher industry output and economic surplus in the equilibrium compared with the expenditure equivalent lump-sum subsidy scheme. However, the later leads to higher total surplus, unless spillover externalities are sufficiently small. Further, the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be excessive or insufficient. A key finding of this paper is that the first-best equilibrium outcome can be implemented through a unique combination of per-unit subsidy and lump-sum subsidy/tax, which involves positive government expenditure in the presence of positive externalities.     

An EM algorithm for the destructive COM-Poisson regression cure rate model

In this paper, we consider a competitive scenario and assume the initial number of competing causes to undergo a destruction after an initial treatment. This brings in a more realistic and practical interpretation of the biological mechanism of the occurrence of tumor since what is recorded is only from the undamaged portion of the original number of competing causes. Instead of assuming any particular distribution for the competing cause, we assume the competing cause to follow a Conway–Maxwell Poisson distribution which brings in flexibility as it can handle both over-dispersion and under-dispersion that we usually encounter in count data. Under this setup and assuming a Weibull distribution to model the time-to-event, we develop the expectation maximization algorithm for such a flexible destructive cure rate model. An extensive simulation study is carried out to demonstrate the performance of the proposed estimation method. Finally, a melanoma data is analyzed for illustrative purpose.     

Sabotaging cost containment

We show that sabotage may be particularly profitable for a vertically-integrated provider (VIP) when its downstream rival can devote effort to reducing its operating costs. Demand-reducing sabotage limits the return the rival anticipates from its cost management activities, and thereby inhibits those activities. The resulting higher costs for the rival increase the VIP’s profit in settings where sabotage would not be profitable if the rival could not manage its operating costs. To limit sabotage by the VIP, the rival may find it profitable to intentionally diminish its ability to reduce its production costs. The diminished ability can produce Pareto gains.     

Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in?

This paper analyzes optimal strategies of an incumbent intermediary, who matches agents on the two sides of a market, in the presence of entry threat under alternative scenarios. It shows that, when entry is free, strategic entry accommodation is the optimal choice of the incumbent—not entry deterrence, unless the variation in agents' types is small. Entry accommodation remains optimal for the incumbent for a wide range of parametric configurations even when there is a fixed cost of entry. These results are in sharp contrast to the predictions of existing models of entry.     

Time-frequency dynamics of return spillover from crude oil to agricultural commodities

ABSTRACT

We explore return spillover from crude oil to ethanol, corn, soybean and wheat on daily data during 17 May 2005–27 June 2018. This study is unique in capturing the time-frequency dynamics of return spillover. We use the frequency-dependent spillover measure that jointly captures information from time and frequency domain. We also identify two endogenous break dates that segregate the study period in three sub-periods. Our results indicate that return spillover from crude oil to ethanol, major feed stocks (i.e. corn and soybean) and food crop (i.e. wheat) is pronounced only in lower frequency band or long-term (more than 1 month). We find that return spillover is stronger only during 2005–2010, i.e. the period of energy and food crisis.     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.