The Nonparametric Approach to Applied Welfare Analysis

Changes in total surplus are traditional measures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizing individual and aggregate consumer demand data with individual quasilinear and homothetic utility functions. Under these conditions, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer welfare. For nonmarketed goods, we propose necessary and sufficient conditions on input market data for efficient production, i.e. production at minimum cost. Under these conditions we derive a cost function for the nonmarketed good, where producer surplus is the area above the marginal cost curve. We are greatful to helpful remarks and comments of the referees and the editor. The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through Grant BEC2002-2130, the Generalitat de Catlaunya, through Grant 2005SGR-00454 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA).     

Prizes for basic research: Human capital,economic might and the shadow of history

We study the distribution of basic scientific research across countries and time, and explain the process that resulted in the United States becoming the undisputed leader in basic research. Our study is based on the records of scientific awards, and on the data of global economic trends. We investigate the degree to which scale/threshold effects account for the number of prizes won. We constructed a stylized model, predicting a non-linear relationship with lagged relative GDP as an important explanatory variable of a country’s share of prizes. Our empirical research findings find support for these predictions and the presence of a “winner-takes-all” effect.      

Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant

Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions.      

Neuroeconomics as a Natural Extension of Bioeconomics: The Shifting Scope of Standard Economic Theory

Synopsis Neuroeconomics rightly has been claimed to be a natural extension of bioeconomics. One of the things bioeconomics investigates is what behavioral dispositions and what behavioral patterns evolutionary processes have produced. Neuroeconomics extends this to the study of evolved mechanisms that are at work in decision-making at the neural level of the brain. The paper argues that in another respect neuroeconomics and bioeconomics are discontinuous, however. Bioeconomics maintains that the applicability of standard economic theory’s constrained maximization framework is not confined to human behavior. The constrained maximization framework is believed to be suitable to describe behavior throughout the animal kingdom. By contrast, despite some minor internal disagreements all neuroeconomists seem to agree that human behavior is predicted poorly by standard economic theory in several social and economic situations. Neuroscience is believed to hold out the hope of an advanced understanding of when and why this is the case.      

Entrepreneurial Structure Qualitative Analysis: The Case of Seville (Spain)

In the field of territorial economic growth, it is possible to identify important characteristics in the entrepreneurial structure, such as the structure of the size of firms, main activity sectors, or the degree of innovation. However, other lesser known characteristics are important also, such as functional dependency, which considers the relationship between small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and suppliers and clients belonging to any territorial field or productive dependency, which considers the level of concentration in terms of buying and selling in connection with the main suppliers and clients, respectively. In order to empirically contrast the importance of these entrepreneurial characteristics and try to relate them with territorial economic growth, a sample of 400 enterprises in the province of Seville (Spain) is used.      

Preferences for Educational Status,Human Capital Accumulation,and Growth

Using an overlapping generations model in which human capital accumulation has positive external effects on the production of the human capital of future generations, this paper analyzes implications of agents’ having preferences for educational status, represented by human capital holdings relative to the social average. Examining the value and sign of the optimal distortionary tax in the optimal taxation scheme, we analyze the efficiency of the level of human capital accumulation in a decentralized economy. The desire for educational status can compensate for insufficient accumulation of human capital stemming from human capital externalities directed toward future generations.     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

The knowledge management strategy and the formation of innovative networks in emerging industries

This paper presents an agent-based simulation model with local network externality to analyze strategic interactions over investment on new economic knowledge. R&D knowledge flows and spillovers are the results of non-cooperative games played between neighboring agents in the model. The model demonstrates a situation where no agents have incentives to hide their economic knowledge, a situation that is observed in open source software development projects. The likelihood of obtaining a stable situation where new economic knowledge is openly shared is increased when heterogeneity of agents is introduced.      

A Test of Two Skew Models to Explain Cooperative Breeding

Synopsis Two competing models, reproductive skew and skew selection, have been constructed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated breeders. Reproductive skew is a trade-off model that assumes breeding occurs under scarce resource conditions. One breeder gains units of fecundity at the expense of other breeders during aggressive, altruistic or tug-of-war transactions. After joining, the distribution of fecundity among breeders shifts from symmetrical to asymmetrical. In contrast, skew selection is a surplus model that assumes breeding occurs during a springtime glut. Skew selection assumes that fecundity among breeders is initially asymmetrical and that joining reduces the asymmetry of fecundity. This paper reports findings from a breeding experiment on the fire ant, Solenopsis invicta, which supported skew selection rather than reproductive skew. Joining was a win-win strategy for alpha and beta breeders; beta breeders gained within-group survival benefits; alpha breeders gained between-group survival benefits. In summary, skew selection extends Darwin’s theory of natural selection by revealing the self-interested core of cooperative breeding.