INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

This paper examines the main causes of the acceleration of inflation in Yugoslavia during the 1980s and Yugoslavia's last attempt at stabilization in 1990. Yugoslav inflation shares common elements with inflation in other highly indebted countries despite appearances otherwise. Like these other countries, Yugoslavia failed to make internal adjustments to match a large transfer to resources abroad, resulting in a large internal redistribution to real resources through inflation. However, in Yugoslavia these internal conditions were not transparent. Instead of an open fiscal deficit, complex interactions took place among enterprises, banks, and the central bank, involving the central bank's absorption and servicing of a large stock of foreign exchange liabilities.
Failure to correct hidden losses in the economy was the main reason that various stabilization attempts failed during the 1980s. The 1990 program was the first to recognize the existence of those hidden losses and the need for a fiscal correction. The program succeeded in eliminating the central bank's own deficit and was initially successful infighting inflation, but pressures to finance enterprises and avoid a liquidity crisis in the financial system resulted in a relaxation of monetary policy and a revival of inflation. Seen from this angle, the Yugoslav program of 1990 resembles other heterodox programs that had initial success in reducing inflation but later faltered because of an insufficient fiscal adjustment.     

PROGRESSIVITY AND REDISTRIBUTION IN NON‐REVENUE NEUTRAL TAX REFORMS: THE LEVEL AND DISTANCE EFFECTS

Kakwani and Reynolds–Smolensky indices are used in the literature to measure the progressivity and redistributive capacity of taxes. These indices may, however, show some limits when used to make normative assessments about non‐revenue neutral tax reforms. Two approaches have traditionally been taken to overcome this problem. The first of these consists of comparing after‐tax income distributions through generalized Lorenz (concentration) curves. The second approach is based on the decomposition of changes in the Reynolds–Smolensky index into changes in the average tax rate and variations in progressivity. Nonetheless, this decomposition between the average tax rate and progressivity may be further exploited to obtain some information that can be relevant to assess tax reforms. The main aim of this study is to draw up some indicators that can be useful to quantify the effects of non‐revenue neutral tax reforms. These indicators are used to investigate the last personal income tax reforms that have taken place in Spain.     

历史法学、统一国家与德国资本主义

本文宏观考察了19世纪德国法理学发展的思想史轨迹。19世纪的德国法理学围绕统一德国的主题而展开,经历了面对统一问题的自由主义法理论与民族主义法理论间的复杂争论。19世纪的德国资产阶级要求的民主问题与地方封建邦的自主要求混杂在一起,从而又危及着德国的统一问题（德国自由主义法理论的困境）;同时,德国的统一问题又与维持德国封建君主制关联在一起（德国民族主义法理论的困境）。这是德国法理学不同于自然法理念的历史法理学特征。可以说,以历史法学为象征的19世纪德国法理论丧失了现代性的普遍品格,成为一种德意志的意识形态。     

Cyclical Risk Aversion,Precautionary Saving,and Monetary Policy

This paper analyzes the conduct of monetary policy in an environment in which cyclical swings in risk appetite affect households’ propensity to save. It uses a New Keynesian model featuring external habit formation to show that taking note of precautionary saving motives justifies an accommodative policy bias in the face of persistent, adverse disturbances. Equally, policy should be more restrictive—that is “lean against the wind”—following positive shocks. Under sufficiently persistent habits it is, in fact, optimal to increase interest rates following a rise in productivity.     

Debt,Taxes, and Banks

Understanding the impact on banks’ capital structures of tax biases toward debt finance is critical to assessing policy responses to socially excessive bank leverage—but there is no empirical evidence of its extent. Guided by some simple theory, this paper explores this impact for a large panel of banks in 82 countries. On average, the tax sensitivity of banks’ leverage proves significant and about as large as for nonfinancial firms. Somewhat counterintuitively, but as the theory suggests, taxation has little impact on the use of hybrids. Banks holding smaller equity buffers and larger banks are noticeably less sensitive to tax.     

Counterexamples on the Superiority of Approval versus Plurality

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability. We also analyze the robustness of such an example to changes in the number of voters and their preferences. To conclude, we present a generic four‐candidate voting environment with the same properties.