Theory and Application of Directional Distance Functions

In 1957 Farrell demonstrated how cost inefficiency could be decomposed into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive components: technical and allocative inefficiency. This result is consequence of the fact that—as shown by Shephard—the cost function and the input distance function (the reciprocal of Farrell's technical efficiency measure) are dual to each other. Similarly, the revenue function and the output distance function are dual providing the basis for the decomposition of revenue inefficiency into technical and allocative components (see for example, Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994)). Here we extend those results to include the directional distance function and its dual, the profit function. This provides the basis for defining and decomposing profit efficiency. As we show, the output and input distance functions (reciprocals of Farrell efficiency measures) are special cases of the directional distance function. We also show how to use the directional distance function as a tool for measuring capacity utilization using DEA type techniques.     

Looking Forward to Performance Improvement: A Field Test of the Feedforward Interview for Performance Management

This study examines the effectiveness of the feedforward interview for improving the job performance of employees relative to a traditional performance appraisal interview in a business equipment firm. Managers (n = 25) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Employees (n = 70) who engaged in a feedforward interview with their manager were observed by an anonymous peer to perform significantly better on the job four months later than employees (n = 75) who received the company's traditional performance appraisal interview. The finding that the feedforward intervention increased performance relative to the performance appraisal indicates that the effect is a relatively enduring one. The results suggest that the feedforward interview should prove useful for human resource managers who are searching for ways to increase the performance of their organization's human resources over and above the traditional performance appraisal. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Flexible collective bargaining agreements: Still a moderating effect on works council behaviour?

We analyse the interaction between different labour market institutions in Germany, namely, industry‐level bargaining and firm‐level codetermination by works councils. In particular, we are interested in the moderating effect of flexibility measures on the link between the existence works councils and collective agreements on wages and productivity. In presence of institutional changes, the question is whether works councils in covered plants still generate rather than redistribute rents, given recent decentralisation processes in the German system of industrial relations. We augment a theoretical model to provide hypotheses, which are then tested using empirical analysis of representative German plant level data. We find that the existence of flexibility provisions in collective bargaining agreements does not alter the effect of works council on firms' wages. We find, however, that with flexibility provisions works council presence is associated with higher productivity levels than without such provisions. These findings, however, depend on the level of collective bargaining: they can only be observed in plants covered by industry‐level contracts, but do not hold in plants covered by firm‐level contracts.