Producer cooperatives: the British experience

The British producer coop movement, though small, is of particular interest because of its rapid current growth and its unusual variety of organizational forms. In this paper, the history, institutional structure, recent development and economic performance of the sector are discussed and policy implications drawn. It is concluded that coops should be particularly aware of problems in management, finance and internal democracy. There remains considerable scope for further public intervention including the formation of specialized support agencies for activities like marketing and training, and to assist in the creation of new coops.     

What Makes Rupert Run

Michael Wolff’s new book, The Man Who Owns the News, chroniclesthe career of News Corp. Chairman Ru-pert Murdoch, using his successful $5.6billion bid last year for Wall Street Jour-nal parent Dow Jones as a key plot de-     

Post-truth: an alumni economist’s perspective

ABSTRACT

Drawing upon 50 years as an academic economist, this lecture to alumni of SOAS’s Department of Economics reflects upon the continual ‘post-truth’ aspects of mainstream economics, ranging over its substantive, if shifting, content, and its treatment of methodology and interdisciplinarity. It draws upon a wide range of theory, empirical analysis, policy and anecdote to highlight both the need for alternatives and the continuing, even increased, failure of the mainstream to engage with criticism and alternatives.     

Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations?

We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain entrepreneurial growth aspirations across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates hypotheses at the national level about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights and greater government activity on entrepreneurs' aspirations to increase employment. We further explore whether individual's social networks compensate for weaknesses in national institutions. We use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys in 42 countries for 2001–2006, applying a multilevel estimation framework to test our ideas. We find that the relationship between growth aspiring entrepreneurs and institutions is complex; they benefit simultaneously from strong government (in the sense of property rights enforcement), and smaller government, but are constrained by corruption. Social networks mediate some but not all institutional deficiencies.