The sales recovery audit: Learning to walk the talk

Little research attention has been devoted to the impact of salesperson failure and recovery management on customer relationship development. This paper develops a theoretically anchored and externally validated sales recovery audit for the purpose of assessing sales organization performance in these matters. Results based on a survey of 177 sales managers indicate that practice of sales recovery efforts lags behind their perceived importance as they relate to organizational success. The sales recovery audit presented here can be a useful tool to continuously evaluate and enhance sales recovery efforts for the purpose of building a stronger relationship selling organization.     

The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons*

The author argues that the root cause of the recent crisis was a housing bubble whose origins can be traced to loose monetary policy and a government housing policy that continually pushed for lower lending standards to increase home ownership. The negative consequences of such policies were amplified when transmitted throughout the financial system by financial institutions through the process of securitization. In attempting to assess culpability for the crisis and identify possible reforms, the author focuses on three categories:

• 1 Defects in Financial Products: Without criticizing derivatives and the process of securitization, the author identifies the sheer complexity of the securities as a major source of the problem—for which the solution is a simpler security design combined with greater disclosure about the underlying assets being securitized.
• 2 Defects in Risk Management: Thanks in large part to agency and other incentive problems, there was universal underestimation of risks by mortgage originators and financial institutions throughout the securitization chain. Changing incentive pay structures is part of the solution, and so are better accounting rules for SPEs. But more effective regulatory oversight and ending “too big to fail” may well be the only way to curb excessive private risk-taking.
• 3 Defects in Government Policy and Regulation: While acknowledging the need for more effective oversight, the author argues that there was ample existing authority for U.S. regulators to have addressed these issues. Lack of power and authority to regulate was not at the heart of the problem—the real problem was lack of foresight and judgment about the unexpected. After expressing doubt that regulators can prevent major financial failures, the author recommends greater attention to devising better methods of resolving such failures when they occur. One of the main goals is to ensure that losses are borne not by taxpayers but by private investors in a way that maintains incentives for market discipline while limiting spillover costs to the entire system.

     

Risk Management,Corporate Governance,and the Search for Long-Term Investors

This discussion explores a number of ways that more effective risk management, corporate governance, and communication with investors can help companies increase their effciency and long-run value. According to one of the panelists, recent surveys of corporate directors suggest that companies should devote more time and attention to three issues—strategy, risk management, and succession planning—and that strategy and risk are the “flipsides of the same coin.” As the panelist argues, “You can't talk about strategy without talking about what risks you're going to take—and what risks you decide to take has to depend on the core competencies that drive the corporate strategy.” In addition to making risk management a critical part of corporate strategy, another notable recommendation is to communicate a company's strategy and business plan as clearly as possible to investors, with the aim of attracting more sophisticated, long-term shareholders. Contrary to popular belief, such a group may well include some hedge funds and other activist shareholders. According to a newly released report on shareholder activism (produced and cited by another panelist), corporate boards should work harder to identify and engage the “largest 10 shareholders in the organization,” with the ultimate goal of cultivating a shareholder base that buys into the company's strategy.     

Evaluating the state of competition of the Greek banking industry

The present paper uses three different New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approaches (Panzar–Rosse, Bresnahan–Lau and Hall–Roeger models) to investigate competitive conditions in the Greek banking sector over the period 1995–2004. One important event which has taken place in the Greek banking industry, especially after 1998, is a wave of mergers and acquisitions. This study also measures and compares the degree of banking competition in two sub-periods, 1995–1998 and 1999–2004, in order to investigate the effect of mergers and acquisitions on the competitive structure of Greek banking. The empirical results of the three models indicate a shift from competitive to non-competitive conditions when moving from the first to the second sub-period. This finding suggests that mergers and acquisitions have affected the level of completion of Greek banking, rendering the industry less competitive. Furthermore, taking into consideration the negative effects of mergers and acquisitions on technical efficiency and the total factor productivity of Greek banking (Rezitis, 2008), the empirical findings of the present study provide some indications that one of the outcomes of the Greek banks’ merging activities, at least in the short run, might be to attain market power and thus higher profits, rather than higher efficiency and lower costs.     

Examining bank SEOs: Are offers made by undercapitalized banks different?

Despite extensive monitoring, banking operations are often considered opaque, and despite explicit capital adequacy regulation, banks may have substantial discretion in their financing. Both monitoring and capital regulation have changed substantially over time, with the adoption of FDICIA being one important breakpoint. This article empirically studies seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by banks to understand how opacity and capital regulation interact to determine the timing of bank SEOs and their market valuation. SEOs both by banks that are undercapitalized relative to regulatory standards and also well-capitalized banks are fully discretionary when it comes to SEOs, even before FDICIA. Both undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks experience similar and significantly negative stock price reactions to SEO announcements, and also have similar prior patterns of insider trading and similar economic drivers of the issuance decision. Moreover, post-SEO abnormal stock returns are similar to benchmark returns for both types of issuers in the long run, suggesting that, contrary to the well-documented evidence for industrial SEOs, investors understand the value implications of bank SEOs upon announcement. The evidence implies that undercapitalized banks' SEOs are more discretionary and that all bank SEOs are less opaque than implied by earlier studies.     

Hot and cold merger markets

We study mergers and acquisition during the period from 1988 to 2005 and examine the impact of merger market intensity, i.e., merger waves, on the means of payment and the returns to target and acquirer shareholders. We use two proxies to measure the intensity of the merger market—the number of mergers in the trailing 12-month period prior to a merger and the total dollar volume of mergers in the trailing 12-month period prior to a merger—and use these measures to define hot and cold merger markets. We find that stock financing is more common after a stock price run-up for the acquiring firm and in hot merger markets. We also find that the acquisition premium is larger in hot merger markets. Returns to acquiring company shareholders are lower for stock financed mergers and are lower when merger markets are intense. Our results are consistent with the predictions of the behavioral theory for merger waves.     

Vacaciones y licencias en países desarrollados: los Estados Unidos a la zaga en cuanto a equilibrio entre vida profesional y vida familiar

Los autores comparan las normativas sobre vacaciones y licencias susceptibles de facilitar el equilibrio entre vida profesional y familiar de Australia, Canadá, República de Corea, Estados Unidos, Europa occidental y Japón utilizando un índice compuesto para clasificarlas. Los Estados Unidos figuran en último lugar: la concesión de vacaciones anuales al trabajador no es obligatoria y las licencias por motivos familiares se limitan a 12 semanas al año. Este bajo nivel de reglamentación podría deberse, según los autores, a una concepción mercantilista del empleo sumada a la creencia de que empleador y trabajadores tienen idéntica capacidad de negociación, visión no compartida por las demás democracias industrializadas.