Can Argentina’s Experience Help Predict the Effects of a Potential Grexit?

In the debate about a possible exit of Greece from the euro area, Argentina is often referred to as an example–both by those in favour of and those warning of the adverse effects of a Grexit. Yet, while Argentina pulled off an impressive economic recovery after its 2001-02 crisis–one that goes beyond a mere commodity boom–there are important structural differences between the two countries, which still render a potential Grexit a very risky endeavour.     

Detecting overdispersion in INARCH(1) processes

A statistical test for the degree of overdispersion of count data time series based on the empirical version of the (Poisson) index of dispersion is considered. The test design relies on asymptotic properties of this index of dispersion, which in turn have been analyzed for time series stemming from a compound Poisson (Poisson‐stopped sum) INAR(1) model. This approach is extended to the popular Poisson INARCH(1) model, which exhibits unconditional overdispersion but has an (equidispersed) conditional Poisson distribution. The asymptotic distribution of the index of dispersion if applied to time series stemming from such a model is derived. These results allow us to investigate the ability of the dispersion test to discriminate between Poisson INAR(1) and INARCH(1) models. Furthermore, the question is considered if the index of dispersion could be used to test the null of a Poisson INARCH(1) model against the alternative of an INARCH(1) model with additional conditional overdispersion.     

Autocracy,democracy and trade policy

This paper develops a politico-economic model for use in studying the role of intra-elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country's political regime, trade policy and income-tax-based redistribution scheme. Three socioeconomic groups are involved: two elite groups and workers, whose preferences regarding trade policy and income taxation are derived from a simple open-economy model. The critical point is that income taxation induces a rich–poor/elite–workers political cleavage, while trade policy opens the door to intra-elite conflict. In this model, when there is no intra-elite conflict, changes in trade policy are associated with political transitions. Coups (democratizations) open up the economy if and only if both elite groups are pro-free-trade (protectionist). However, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade policy and reallocating political power within the elite (to the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers) rather than offering to democratize the country. The change in trade policy is credible because the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers controls the autocracy. Moreover, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, coups tend to result in the maintenance of the existing trade policy unless popular demands are extremely radical and/or the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers is exceptionally weak.     

A boosting approach to forecasting gold and silver returns: economic and statistical forecast evaluation

We use a boosting algorithm to forecast the returns of gold and silver prices. We then study the implications of using different information criteria to terminate the boosting algorithm in terms of the statistical and economic performance of a forecasting model. Our findings demonstrate that information criteria that select parsimonious forecasting models perform better in statistical terms than information criteria that select relatively complex forecasting models, but this good performance does not necessarily survive an economic performance evaluation.     

Fictitious play in games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour

In the 1960s Shapley provided an example of a two-player fictitious game with periodic behaviour. In this game, player A aims to copy B's behaviour and player B aims to play one ahead of player A. In this paper we generalise Shapley's example by introducing an external parameter. We show that the periodic behaviour in Shapley's example at some critical parameter value disintegrates into unpredictable (chaotic) behaviour, with players dithering a huge number of times between different strategies. At a further critical parameter the dynamics becomes periodic again, but now both players aim to play one ahead of the other. In this paper we adopt a geometric (dynamical systems) approach. Here we prove rigorous results on continuity of the dynamics and on the periodic behaviour, while in the sequel to this paper we shall describe the chaotic behaviour.     

The haw par affair and the reporting of related party transactions

It is generally recognised that managers are concerned with how transfer prices should be determined. This paper deals with an extension of this concern, namely, how transactions between related parties should be reported in published financial statements. The mode of reporting is regulated by national accounting standard which are in turn strongly influenced by the standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee. This paper examines theproposed International Accounting Standard on Related Party Transactions by applying the standardhypothetically to the facts of a major court case on the subject.The author is a Senior Lecturer with the School of Accountancy at the National University of Singapore     

Lévy term structure models: No-arbitrage and completeness

The Lévy term structure model due to Eberlein and Raible is extended to non-homogeneous driving processes. The classes of equivalent martingale and local martingale measures for various filtrations are characterized. It turns out that in a number of standard situations the martingale measure is unique.Received: May 2004, Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 60H30, 91B28, 60G51JEL Classification: E43, G13Work supported in part by the European Communitys Human Potential Programme under contract HPRN-CT-2000-00100, DYNSTOCH.     

Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines

We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay the rich. Even the possibility of price discrimination does not remove this incentive. We demonstrate that the weaknesses of standard policy measures are mitigated when income heterogeneity is taken into account. This offers an efficiency based rationale for distribution oriented national or international public health interventions.