Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses and Debt Rating Changes

This article examines the effect of corporate reporting of internal control weaknesses on debt rating changes. Bond rating agencies utilize (among other factors) financial statement information to assess a firm’s liquidity and long term solvency as important inputs in determining corporate debt rating. Reporting of internal control weaknesses increases the reliability and transparency risk of the financial statement information, which may lead rating agencies to revise corporate default risk. Our results indicate that reporting of internal control weaknesses is significantly associated with debt ratings after controlling for other firm specific factors. Specifically, these findings suggest that reporting of internal control weaknesses can result in downgrades of the firm’s outstanding debt.     

Transparency and market quality: Evidence from SuperMontage

In this study, we examine the effect of pre-trade transparency on market quality using data before and after the introduction of SuperMontage. Our results show that both bid–ask spreads and return volatility declined significantly after the implementation of SuperMontage. In addition, SuperMontage led to significant improvements in the SEC Rule 605 execution quality measures (e.g., faster executions and higher fill rates). Overall, our results indicate that SuperMontage improved market and execution quality on NASDAQ through greater pre-trade transparency and the integrated, more efficient quotation and trading system.     

Information-Based Trading and Price Improvement

Abstract:  In this study we test the information hypothesis of price improvement. Our results show that price improvement is negatively related to both the probability of information-based trading and the price impact of trades. We interpret these results as evidence that liquidity providers selectively offer price improvements according to the information content of trades. We also show that liquidity providers offer greater (and more frequent) price improvements when they are at the NBBO, and for stocks with wider spreads, fewer trades, or smaller trade sizes relative to the quoted depth. Buyer-initiated trades receive smaller (larger) price improvements than seller-initiated trades on the NYSE (NASDAQ).     

A multi-facet item response theory approach to improve customer satisfaction using online product ratings

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science - While online platforms often provide a single composite rating and the ratings of different attributes of a product, they largely ignore the attribute...     

Adverse-Selection Costs and the Probability of Information-Based Trading

Prior studies offer various empirical models to decompose the observed bid‐ask spread into the adverse‐selection and transitory (order‐processing and inventory‐holding) components. There is limited evidence, however, on whether the spread components estimated from these models indeed measure what they purport to measure. In this study, we show that the estimates of the adverse‐selection component given by these models are positively and significantly related to the probability of information‐based trading (PIN), after controlling for the endogeneity of the PIN and other stock attributes. These results provide direct empirical support for the spread component models examined in the present study.     

Motivations for Loan Herding by Chinese Banks and Its Impact on Bank Performance

This study uses a dynamic herding model that considers intertemporal and cross‐sectional correlation to confirm that loan herding occurs among joint‐stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). We clarify the motivations for bank loan herding. We find that loan herding by both JSCBs and CCBs results more from following the behavior of other same‐type banks than different‐type banks because of characteristic herding or reputational concerns. Loan herding by JSCBs is motivated by investigative herding, whereas loan herding by CCBs results from informational cascades. Moreover, loan herding has a significantly harmful impact on the operating performance of CCBs but not JSCBs, which may be explained by the irrational behavior of CCBs. Our results will help Chinese bank supervisors develop appropriate policies for handling loan herding.     

Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and Insider Trading

We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading under the assumption that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism. We document that insider purchase profitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher on average in more tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and is accentuated for firms with a more opaque information environment. In addition, we provide empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Finally, we find that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability weakens after the introduction of FIN 48, consistent with the increased transparency of tax positions under the new disclosure requirement reducing insiders' information advantage and hence their ability to profit from insider trading. To the extent that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism, our results are consistent with managers exploiting the opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to extract rent from shareholders, particularly those shareholders who sold their shares to the managers. Our findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences.