A note on the extension of tables for the Friedman statistic

Abstract  The tables for the Friedman rank-test arc extended using a sampling method. A table is given for the traditional significance levels .01, .025, .05 and .10 for number of blocks equal to 7 and 8 and for treatments of size 6 and 7. A brief discussion of available tables is also included along with an example of an application.     

Exceptional Convergence of the Sample Variance

The case is investigated when Hoeffding's one sample U–statistic theorem for the sample variance S² is not applicable. It is shown that this occurs only when the parent distribution is the two–point distribution with jumps of equal magnitude. For this exceptional case the standardised S² is shown to converge in distribution to (1 – V )√2, where V has chi–square distribution with one degree of freedom.     

Exact finite sample properties of double k-class estimators in simultaneous equations

In our earlier paper [Srivastava, Agnihotri and Dwivedi (1980)] the dominance of double k-class over k-class with respect to exact mean squared error matrix criteria is established. It is observed that given a member of k-class, one can pick up a member of double k-class that will provide an improved estimator of the coefficients. This result prompted us to study the exact finite sample properties of the double k-class estimator. For this, we have considered a structural equation containing two endogenous variables and have investigated the properties of double k-class estimators of the coefficients of explanatory endogenous variables assuming characterizing scalars to be non-stochastic.     

Political Profit: Taxing and Spending in the Hierarchical State

A bstract . The actions of government fall into two types: taxes (the taking of property ) and expenditures (the awarding of gifts ). Politicians profit as long as the value of resources raised from taxation exceeds the cost of expenditures. From their point of view, fiscal efficiency consists in maximizing the support obtained by spending and minimizing the opposition generated by taxing. This is accomplished by spending on well-organized groups and taxing the uninformed public. This results in the "iron law of political redistribution" in which income and wealth are transferred from the latter to the former. In a hierarchical State , it is usually profitable for those at the top to centralize control over taxing and spending, if for no other reason than to make it difficult for politicians at lower levels to compete against them. This gives rise to the "law of hierarchical centralization "—in a hierarchical State, power becomes centralized over time. The greater the power of government, the faster this process takes place. In order to avoid this problem, one could design constitutions which are non-hierarchical in nature, in which each unit of government is completely autonomous from the others, as firms are in a free market.     

A probability inequality for ranges and its application to maximum range test procedures

Summary It is proved that for any fixed argument the sequence (P _k) of the distribution functions of the ranges ofk i.i.d. univariate random variables is log-concave if the random variables have a log-concave density. If the support of the distribution is an infinite interval and the density is monotonous then the theorem holds also with “log-convex” instead of “log-concave”. The resulting inequalities can be used by a quick algorithm for closed maximum range test procedures for all pairwise comparisons (Royen 1988, 1989a, 1989b). Under the above assumptions the application of this algorithm can be extended e.g. to pairwise comparisons of variances.     

Aggregation effects on price and expenditure elasticities in a quadratic almost ideal demand system

Abstract.  While it is well known that demand elasticities calculated at the macro level will in general differ from those calculated at the micro level because of aggregation effects, there remain the questions of how large the effects are and how they vary with the degree of inequality in the income distribution. We explore these questions with models based on a quadratic version of the Almost Ideal Demand System. We investigate the elasticity differences theoretically and then calibrate the models and generate numerical results, using income data for seven countries with widely different distributions. The aggregation effects are found generally to be rather small, even with highly unequal income distributions.     

FDI in space: Spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment

There are a number of theoretical reasons why foreign direct investment (FDI) into a host country may depend on the FDI in proximate countries. Such spatial interdependence has been largely ignored by the empirical FDI literature, with only a couple recent papers accounting for such issues in their estimation. This paper conducts a general examination of spatial interactions in empirical FDI models using data on US outbound FDI activity. We find that estimated relationships of traditional determinants of FDI are surprisingly robust to inclusion of terms to capture spatial interdependence, even though such interdependence is estimated to be significant. However, we find that both the traditional determinants of FDI and the estimated spatial interdependence are quite sensitive to the sample of countries one examines.