Inequality and Unemployment Patterns in Europe: Does Integration Lead to (Real) Convergence?

The economic convergence criteria adopted in the Maastricht Treaty and the fiscal discipline of the Stability and Growth Pact enforced nominal convergence, leaving aside real convergence indicators. In this paper, we use cluster analysis to examine the convergence patterns of income inequality, absolute redistribution (a measure of governments’ effectiveness in correcting for inequality) and unemployment. The expected outcome after years of economic integration was, ex-ante, convergence to a single cluster. Our results, however, uncover a variety of groups, implying that economic integration has not led to real economic convergence. Moreover, the existence of different patterns suggests: (i) that traditional classifications (Anglo-Saxon, Continental European, European Periphery, and Nordic models) remain broadly valid; (ii) that there is no unemployment-inequality trade-off to be exploited in terms of economic policy; and (iii) that the redistributive capacity of governments plays a pivotal role in coping with inequality without negative effects in terms of unemployment.     

Assessing Productivity Gains from International Trade in a Small Open Economy

Empirical evidence suggests that exporter firms tend to charge higher markups than non-exporters due to trade barriers. The exporters’ markup premium, however, may disappear in a special case, namely when the home country is small relative to its trade partners and trade barriers are low. This can be because competition is more intense in the large export destination than in the small home country, so that firms are able to set higher markups for locally sold products but not for exports. This paper provides empirical evidence on the validity of this special case by estimating markups for firms in Luxembourg who generally export to larger countries. The estimated negative markup premium for exporters has important implications for the productivity measurement. In a sufficiently small open economy, exporters’ productivity may be biased downward, when the firm-level markup variation is not controlled for in the productivity estimation. The bias in the productivity estimates further leads to the inaccurate conclusion that openness to international trade lowers allocative efficiency.     

Comparative Assessment of Mortality Rate of the Population in Russian and Foreign Megacities

The article presents the results of a comparative analysis of mortality trends in two Russian capitals and two cities with population over one million, Krasnoyarsk and Rostov-on-Don, in comparison with foreign megacities (Berlin, Hong Kong, London, Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Singapore, Tokyo). From 1990 to 2015, in the Russian “model cities” the standardized mortality rates (SMR) for all causes on average decreased by almost a third: most in Moscow (44% for men and 42% for women) and less for Krasnoyarsk (22% for both men and women). An assessment of the statistical reliability of the decrease in SMR on the basis of long time series showed the absence of a positive dynamic of mortality from diseases of the digestive organs, mainly cirrhosis, which confirms the presence of the alcoholic component. Despite the sufficiently steady decline in mortality in the early 2000s, its level in Russian cities continues to significantly exceed the mortality rate in foreign megacities.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.