Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

The Structure of Protection in Indonesia in 1989 1

Around the mid-1980s, Indonesia's protectionist regime supported an industrial structure in which industries were mainly oriented towards producing for the domestic market. Since then, trade policies have shifted to a more outward-looking strategy, stimulating the growth and diversification of non-oil manufactured exports. This paper attempts to quantify the nominal and effective rates of protection resulting from trade policies at the end of the 1980s. After an introduction in which the 1989 trade policies are discussed, estimates of nominal and effective rates of protection are presented. It is shown that though the level of protection has declined since 1987, it still varies widely across economic sectors. Furthermore, despite the more open trade strategy, the paper's findings show that the trade regime remains biased against exports. Finally, by examining some trade policy issues, the paper presents further ways of rationalising the structure of protection in Indonesia's industrial sector.     

REBALANCING EC CEREALS PROTECTION AND THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND

This paper considers the proposals put forward by the EC at the GATT Uruguay Round in December 1990. The EC's objective of rebalancing the Common Agricultural Policy in the context of a partial liberalisation of agricultural support on the world cereals market is assessed, as is the choice of base year from which liberalisation would have been initiated. The US's proposal for more significant reduction in agricultural support is also considered. The results show that the EC would not necessarily have benefited from rebalancing, since the effects would have depended on the choice of base period. For example, with 1986 (1988) as the base year, net welfare changes would have been 20 (50) percent higher (lower) with rebalancing, relative to the case without. Not surprisingly, the more substantial liberalisation proposed by the US would have resulted in greater net welfare gains even if rebalancing was conceded by the US.     

Financing budget deficits in the Netherlands

Summary In The Netherlands public debt management is in the hands of the budgetary policy-maker, whose recourse to the capital market can exceed or fall short of the total borrowing requirement in order to absorb or create liquidity. The conduct of that policy since the early 1960's is analyzed in this paper, emphasizing the importance of medium-term control over the public finances as a prerequisite for the ability of debt management to make a flexible contribution to monetary policy. During the 1960's this condition was satisfied and debt management followed a stable countercyclical pattern which, however, was abandoned after the early 1970's as the public finances swung into substantial disequilibrium.The author thanks J. Boughton, L. Bovenberg, D. Hendry, P. Masson, J. Muellbauer, and the referees for comments on earlier versions. However, the views expressed are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund.     

Exchange rate volatility and its impact on the transaction costs of covered interest rate parity

This paper provides empirical evidence on the linkage between foreign exchange market volatility and daily 90-day covered interest rate parity (CIP) conditions of the three major exchange rates against the US dollar (US$). Markov regime shifting models were utilized to generate time series of volatility regime probabilities and these were used to explain the first and second moments of the daily deviations from and the transaction cost bands around the covered parity conditions. We find a significant positive relationship between the deviations and the regime probabilities, indicating an increasing probability of higher volatility state being associated with rising deviations (both first and second moments) from the parity condition. Similar positive relationship is found for the transaction bands. Rising (falling) probabilities of high (low) volatility regimes increased the first and second moments of the bands. Furthermore, we find a higher volatility state combined with a US$ depreciation is associated with significantly higher volatility in the daily deviations than an appreciation. Also, US$ depreciation is associated with widening transaction bands. This suggests that the level of market uncertainty was higher when the US$ was depreciating.     

Teams,Teamwork and Absence*

We argue that firms with interdependent worker productivity, team production, have a higher cost of absence and, as a consequence, spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates. We estimate the determinants of absence for blue‐collar workers using a sample of German manufacturing establishments. Workplace teams are used as a proxy for team production. The estimates reveal that firms with teams have lower absence rates, as do smaller establishments. The size effect, however, is unique to establishments with teams, which fits prior theoretical work that has not been previously tested.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71