Advertising competition and industry channel structure

The introduction of independent retailers has long been recognized as a buffer that alleviates the price competition between channels. In this paper, we argue that this effect may be counter-balanced if the manufacturers compete along dimensions that differ from prices (such as advertising). We find that delegating to retailers may intensify other non-price competition between the manufacturers and therefore make the manufacturers worse off. Our analysis shows that the “retailer buffer” may be a two-edged sword and thus suggests that channel structure may critically depend on the specific dimensions along which the manufacturers compete with each other.     

Management Students’ Attitudes Toward Business Ethics: A Comparison Between France and Romania

This study focuses on the differences in the perception of business ethics across two groups of management students from France and Romania (n = 220). Data was collected via the ATBEQ to measure preferences for three business philosophies: Machiavellianism, Social Darwinism, and Moral Objectivism. The results show that Romanian students present more favorable attitudes toward Machiavellianism than French students; whereas, French students valued Social Darwinism and Moral Objectivism more highly. For Machiavellianism and Moral Objectivism the results are consistent with the literature and our hypotheses. However, contrary to our expectations, we find that Social Darwinism is more important in France than Romania. The results indicate that religious practice does not influence preferences for the three business philosophies. In terms of gender differences, women have less favorable attitudes toward Machiavellianism and more favorable attitudes toward Moral Objectivism than men.     

Der MDK kommt!

Vorbereitung auf die Qualit?tsprüfung — Steht der MDK unangemeldet vor der Tür, kommt es unter den Mitarbeitern h?ufig zu Unsicherheiten, die sich negativ auf die Prüfung auswirken k?nnen. Doch durch klare Aufgabenverteilungen und einen „Handlungsleitfaden“ legen Sie und Ihre Mitarbeiter den Grundstein für ein gutes Prüfungsergebnis.     

Transformationen einer Marketing- und Vertriebsorganisation

Die Dynamik und Wettbewerbsintensit?t im Medizintechnik-Markt der Ultraschallsysteme zwingt Hersteller permanent zur Anpassung ihrer Strategien und Unternehmensstrukturen. Der vorliegende Praxisbericht zeigt, warum und wie Siemens Medical Solutions seine Marketingorganisation für das Ultraschallgesch?ft in EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa) von einer eher reaktiven Supportfunktion zu einer proaktiven und gesch?ftsentwickelnden Funktion transformiert hat und nach welchen Prinzipien diese funktioniert.     

The Creation of Value Through Corporate Reputation

The relationship between social and financial performance (CSP – FP) has been a main objective in the literature on business management, as it would provide an economic justification for the social investment insofar as it contributes to the creation of value. This relationship has been empirically tested by several authors though without using a theoretical model that sustains this relationship. The aim of this article is to propose a theoretical model of the process of the creation of value from the reputation generated by companies, integrating the factors that have been shown to be more relevant in this process from previous research, in such a way that hypotheses are put forward regarding the existence of this relationship and the factors that determine it. Finally, an empirical test is performed using the 100 most prestigious companies operating in Spain during 2004.     

The complete incremental cost test for cross-subsidies with a sub-modular cost function

The complete Incremental Cost Test for cross-subsidies can be difficult to apply to a multi-product enterprise because every possible subset of products must be tested. However, this combinatorial problem can be avoided when the enterprise’s cost function is sub-modular by identifying the smallest subset of products causing the maximum cross-subsidy. This subset contains all of the products, and only those products, that are responsible for the cross-subsidies left by a stipulated set of prices. In addition, the subset can often be identified with a simple and efficient Myopic Algorithm. The algorithm should be particularly useful as a method for detecting cross-subsidies in regulated enterprises and networks because the cost functions for these industries are typically sub-modular.     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

Allowing communities to trade in imperfectly competitive pollution-permit markets

Citizens and organizations representing them play an increasingly important role in markets for environmental quality, but much remains to be learned about how their participation affects these markets. We analyze the effects of allowing a community of citizens to trade pollution permits in an imperfectly competitive permit market. Allowing the community to trade directly reveals its preferences, which enhances welfare. However, community participation may also exacerbate distortions due to market power, even though the community itself trades competitively. Including the community in permit distribution may exacerbate market power distortions by affecting a dominant trader’s propensity to participate in the permit market. Second, the community’s demand/supply for permits may be more inelastic than other traders and worsen distortions due to market power. We illustrate in an example that these negative effects on competition can dominate the positive effect from preference revelation through the market place.