Premium,merger fees and the choice of investment banks: A simultaneous analysis

We analyze 635 US M&A transactions from 1985 to 2004. In contrast with prior research, we distinguish between the target and acquirer fees, and examine their independent effects on the level of the merger premium. The study provides evidence of a positive (negative) association between target (acquirer) fees and the level of the premium. It indicates that the reputation of investment banks affects the level of merger fees, but does not affect the level of the premium. The findings confirm the conflict of interests between target and acquirer firms where the investment banks’ efforts are positively related to shareholders’ interest. The study also finds that when acquirers pay higher fees than target firms, they pay lower premiums. The findings also imply that for the small proportion of mergers (13%) resulting in relatively large value gains for buying firms, an acquirer might be willing to pay large advisory fees even though this may result in a higher premium.     

Institutions and economic development: A Granger causality analysis of panel data evidence

This study examines the causal relationship between institutions and economic development using a panel Granger causality test. The study incorporates two institutional datasets, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and World Governance Indicators (WGI). The empirical results based on 60 countries show that there is a bi-directional causality between institutions and economic development. The findings also suggest that causality patterns between institutions and economic performance vary at different stages of income level. Better institutional quality fosters economic development in higher income countries, whereas economic development tends to enhance institutional quality in lower income countries.     

Forecast accuracy in initial public offerings and the impact of external constraints relative to managerial choice: a research note

We examine the accuracy of earnings forecasts published in prospectuses, under conditions where external influences of state regulation and economic condition act as constraints to mitigate management optimism. Our results indicate that regulation has no significant impact, but economic condition and management optimism are significantly associated with forecast accuracy. We conclude that a study of forecast accuracy over time must take into account external influences and that attempting to use regulation to improve forecast accuracy is not an effective strategy when there are strongly adverse economic conditions and when promoters or managers are optimistic in forecasting.     

Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper is about price and wage competition in a dynamicgeneral equilibrium model. We consider an equity financed economywhere firms need money to finance their input costs. Part ofthe output is sold for money to be used in the next period asworking capital and the remaining part is distributed to ownersas real dividends. We first characterize the steady state competitiveequilibrium path. Second, we study whether this competitiveequilibrium can be supported as a pure strategy Nash equilibriumin price and wage setting games. We prove a positive resultfor price competition and a negative one for wage competition.     

An opinion survey of malaysian middle level managers and professionals

This study reports the results of an opinion survey of a Malaysian managerial subelite, potential future business and government leaders. Their responses to propositions put forth in a detailed questionnaire indicate that they have values conforming to those associated with Western bureaucratic society. The results of this 1982 survey are discussed under the topics of attitudes toward women, attitudes toward business and religion, station in life, and peer trust levels.Bernard Sarachek is with the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Aziz Abdul Hamid and Zakaria Bin Ismail are with the Faculty of Business Management, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.     

The Need for Regulating a Bayesian Regulator

This paper analyzes the Baron and Myersons (B–M) (Econometrica 50: 911–930 [1982]) scheme of monopoly regulation, a standard representative of Bayesian mechanisms. As is well known, the hboxB–M mechanism (and other related mechanisms) have as an explicit starting point the assumption that the regulator has an unchallenged prior belief about the cost function of the regulated monopolist.We analyze here the consequences resulting from the possibility that this prior belief may be subject to influence or manipulable. As we show in detail, under the B–M scheme, consumers and the regulated monopoly are highly sensitive to the regulators prior belief about the (private) cost information of the monopolist. Therefore, if a regulators beliefs are unaccountable to and unverifiable by a higher ity, the regulator has both the incentive and the possibility to change and/or misrepresent his prior belief when facing pressure or payoffs from interest groups representing consumers or the regulated firm. The results here show that the outcomes under a B–M mechanism favoring one or another interest group can vary over a wide spectrum. The results are consistent with capture theory and rent-seeking explanations of monopoly regulation and suggest the need to exercise care in using the insights and results of Bayesian regulatory theory to inform practice.     

Change of numeraire in the two-marginals martingale transport problem

In this paper, we apply change of numeraire techniques to the optimal transport approach for computing model-free prices of derivatives in a two-period setting. In particular, we consider the optimal transport plan constructed in Hobson and Klimmek (Finance Stoch. 19:189–214, 2015) as well as the one introduced in Beiglböck and Juillet (Ann. Probab. 44:42–106, 2016) and further studied in Henry-Labordère and Touzi (Finance Stoch. 20:635–668, 2016). We show that in the case of positive martingales, a suitable change of numeraire applied to Hobson and Klimmek (Finance Stoch. 19:189–214, 2015) exchanges forward start straddles of type I and type II, so that the optimal transport plan in the subhedging problems is the same for both types of options. Moreover, for Henry-Labordère and Touzi’s (Finance Stoch. 20:635–668, 2016) construction, the right-monotone transference plan can be viewed as a mirror coupling of its left counterpart under the change of numeraire.