Financial Reporting Quality in Private Equity Backed Companies: The Impact of Ownership Concentration

We empirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted, private equity backed companies that the shareholder structure of private companies impacts the quality of their publicly available accounting information. More precisely, companies in which private equity (PE) investors have a high equity stake produce lower quality accounting information than companies in which PE investors have a low equity stake, after controlling for factors like company size and age. We explain our findings by arguing that PE investors with low equity stakes have a higher need for high quality accounting information whereas PE investors with high equity stakes have other means to closely monitor their portfolio companies. This paper has benefited form discussions with workshop participants at the Max Planck Institute. We specifically want to thank Lorraine Uhlaner and Mike Wright (guest editors), two anonymous referees as well as ignace De Beelde, Wouter De Maeseneire, Marc Deloof, Miguel Meuleman and Lloyd Steier for helpful suggestions. Part of this research was completed when Christof Beuselinck was an FWO Scholar at Ghent University. Financial support from the Fonds of Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Grant G.0012.02) is kindly appreciated. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Functional forms and educational production functions

Different functional forms are proposed and applied in the context of educational production functions. Policy implications of such an approach in terms of school interventions are discussed in the paper.     

A conceptual development of Simons’ Levers of Control framework

The management control literature has been criticised for having concepts that are ill-defined. This causes mixed empirical results and makes it difficult to build a coherent body of knowledge. The paper addresses this issue by developing an important framework, that of Simons’ Levers of Control, which has been criticised in the past for its vague and ambiguous definitions. Using methods of concept analysis, the paper analyses prior literature to identify ambiguities with the different levers of control and uses examples from prior field studies to illustrate these ambiguities. The paper also analyses the positive and negative dimensions of controls, which, although part of Simons’ framework, have remained unexplored. For each ambiguity identified, the paper proposes a solution to improve concept definitions or to clarify the relationship between concepts. The result is a revised framework that explicitly separates managerial intentions for controls and employee perceptions of controls. Managerial intentions are comprised of three levels: 1) types of controls (social and technical) 2) which are organised as four control systems (strategic performance, operational performance, strategic boundaries and operational boundaries) and 3) which can be used diagnostically or interactively, have an enabling or constraining role and can lead to either reward or punishment. Finally, after defining the framework's concepts and explaining how they interact, the paper concludes by offering avenues for future research.     

Bargained Equality: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Workplace Gender Equality Agreements and Plans in France

‘Bargained equality’ reflects wider characteristics of French employment relations whereby state‐driven collective bargaining is a major mode of regulation but is based on weak workplace bargaining cultures outside the largest firms. This article focuses on duties on French employers to bargain on gender equality. It presents findings of a project evaluating workplace agreements and plans on gender equality, based on a sample of 186 agreements submitted in 2014–2015, in 10 sectors, and in‐depth interviews in 20 companies. Despite a rise in formal compliance due to stronger enforcement since 2012, our analysis shows that most companies submitting plans or agreements do not systematically address quantitative measurement of pay or other gender gaps. As well as sectoral differences, the analysis also identifies ‘generational effects’: processes of change which occur as collective agreements expire and are replaced are dependent on local dynamics of bargaining. Based on this analysis, we argue that attention should be paid to the resources available to local bargaining actors, in order to promote an equality agenda.     

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers