Separating real incentives and accountability

Accountability—the expectation on the side of the decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—has been found by psychologists to strongly influence decision-making processes. The awareness of this issue remains however limited amongst economists, who tend to focus on the motivational effects of financial incentives. Accountability and incentives may provide different motivations for decision makers, and disentangling their effects is thus important for understanding real-world situations in which both are present. Separating accountability and incentives, I find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the normatively superior simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction.     

Valuing improved hurricane forecasts

The value to households of improved hurricane forecasts is estimated from a pilot survey using discrete choice econometric methods. Each household is willing to pay approximately $13 for improvements in forecast attributes such as landfall time and position, wind speed, and storm surge.     

Endowment effects in contests

We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings.     

A simple method for estimating unconditional heterogeneity distributions in correlated random effects models

I propose a general, simple approach to recovering an unconditional heterogeneity distribution when a conditional distribution has been estimated. The approach can be applied to cross section models and panel data models-both static and dynamic-with unobserved heterogeneity.     

The inflation and inflation uncertainty relationship for Turkey: a dynamic framework

This article assesses the interaction between inflation and inflation uncertainty in a dynamic framework for Turkey by using monthly data for the time period 1984–2009. The bulk of previous studies investigating the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty employ Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH)-type models, which consider inflation uncertainty as a predetermined function of innovations to inflation specification. The stochastic volatility in mean (SVM) models that we use allow for gathering innovations to inflation uncertainty and assess the effect of inflation volatility shocks on inflation over time. When we assess the interaction between inflation and its volatility, the empirical findings indicate that response of inflation to inflation volatility is positive and statistically significant. However, the response of inflation volatility to inflation is negative but not statistically significant.     

The factory system in the British industrial revolution: A complementarity thesis

This paper offers an explanation for the rise of the factory system in Britain during the Industrial Revolution (1770-1850) based on the concept of complementarity: Investment in machinery, process supervision, and improved quality control formed a cluster of complementary activities in which adopting any one increased the marginal return to also adopting the others. Further, factory owners introduced process supervision not only to increase work effort, but also to balance worker incentives among production, quality control, and asset maintenance tasks. To test this hypothesis, I have constructed a new data set from firm studies and archival records. Measures of firms’ adoption of the activities are positively correlated in the cross-section of firms, providing evidence in favor of the complementarity hypothesis.     

Effective property rights, conflict and growth

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving.