Spatial interactions among U.S. cities: 1900–1990

We test implications of economic geography by exploring spatial interactions among U.S. cities. We use a data set consisting of 1900–1990 metro area populations, and spatial measures including distance from the nearest larger city in a higher-tier, adjacency, and location within U.S. regions. We also date cities from their time of settlement. We find that among cities which enter the system, larger cities are more likely to locate near other cities. Moreover, older cities are more likely to have neighbors. Distance from the nearest higher-tier city is not always a significant determinant of size and growth. We find no evidence of persistent non-linear effects on urban growth of either size or distance, although distance is important for city size for some years.     

Residential Mobility and the Housing Market in a Two-sector Neoclassical Growth Model

The impact of residential mobility and competitive housing markets on long run growth is examined using a two-sector general equilibrium overlapping-generations model in continuous time. There is an infinity of agents with finite lives who adjust their housing consumption by moving, which is costly. We explore the model's steady-state properties, first with a free housing market, then under rent control when the market clears through restrictions on the frequency of moves. Rent controls do not just reduce welfare; they may increase the steady-state capital-labor ratio.     

International market segmentation and Eurodebt issues

Implications of capital market segmentation for international capital structure (ICS)—capital structure consisting of equity issued in one country and debt issued in another—are examined. Necessary conditions for the emergence of ICS are analyzed under two options for debt issues (foreign debt and Eurodebt) and comparisons are made. It is shown that in cases where the project cannot support an ICS including foreign debt Eurobonds can be issued and would be profitable.     

Fairness and reflexivity in the Cyprus bail-in

The Cyprus debt crisis provides some unique lessons. By the time an assistance program was agreed with the Troika of international lenders, the problem had become so complex that a depositor bail-in was implemented to safeguard financial stability. The bail-in was an ad hoc solution applied for the first time in the eurozone but is now the blueprint for dealing with future banking crises. This paper examines the events for the 18-month period before the two eurogroup meetings on Cyprus in March 2013, and the resolution and restructuring of the two systemic banks of the country with depositor bail-in. We show how delays in dealing with the crisis exacerbated the problem but also how the tools brought into solve the problem had significant unintended consequences that fit the reflexivity principle. Available evidence questions the validity of confidential studies guiding the policy decisions on depositor haircut and supports the argument that the bail-in, as implemented in Cyprus, violated international principles of fairness. We use the analysis to draw some lessons on the use of bail-in for future crises.