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81.
We study the local turnpike property for two classes of infinite-horizon discrete-time deterministic maximization problems
which have common applications, e.g., optimal growth theory. We follow a functional-analytic approach and rely on an implicit
function theorem for the space of the sequences which converge to zero. We shall assume the existence of an optimal path which
is not necessarily a steady-state. Relying on material developped in Blot and Crettez (Decis Econo Finance 27:1–34, 2004),
“On the smoothness of optimal paths” Decis Econ Finance, 21:1–34, 2004), we provide conditions under which a variation in
the initial conditions (i.e., capital stock and discount rate) yields an optimal solution which converges toward a reference
solution when time becomes infinite. We also provide new results on bounded solutions of difference equations.
We gratefully thank the editor, Silvano Holzer, and two anonymous referees for remarks and advices on a previous version of
this paper. 相似文献
82.
In this paper, progressive stress accelerated life tests are considered when the lifetime of a product under use condition
follows a finite mixture of distributions. The experiment is performed when each of the components in the mixture follows
a general class of distributions which includes, among others, the Weibull, compound Weibull, power function, Gompertz and
compound Gompertz distributions. It is assumed that the scale parameter of each component satisfies the inverse power low,
the progressive stress is directly proportional to time and the cumulative exposure model for the effect of changing stress
holds. Based on type-I censoring, the maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the parameters under consideration are obtained.
A special attention is paid to a mixture of two Rayleigh components. Simulation results are carried out to study the precision
of the MLEs and to obtain confidence intervals for the parameters involved. 相似文献
83.
Die Notwendigkeit zur wertorientierten Führung und Steuerung von Unternehmungen gewinnt durch die zunehmende Professionalisierung
der Kapitalmarktteilnehmer, die Basel-II-Richtlinien für Banken sowie die Neuregelung zum Goodwill Impairment weiter an Dynamik.
Innerhalb der Wertkonzepte nehmen Kapitalkosten als zentraler „value driver“ eine herausragende Bedeutung ein. Vor diesem
Hintergrund werden die unterschiedlichen Verfahren zur Ermittlung von Kapitalkosten, darunter auch das erst kürzlich vorgestellte
Market-derived Capital Pricing Model, diskutiert und mittels eines zu entwickelnden Kriterienrasters systematisch miteinander
verglichen. Schlie?lich entwickelt der Beitrag aus den Erkenntnissen des Verfahrensvergleichs sowie einer Expertenbefragung
praktische Anwendungsempfehlungen. 相似文献
84.
In this paper characterizations of negative multinomial distributions based on conditional distributions have been studied. 相似文献
85.
We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We
consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who
choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends
on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case
the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing.
In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger
likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support. 相似文献
86.
This empirical note extends the recent work by Holmes (2006) in examining the long-run relationship between private and public
savings in the U.S. over the post-World War II period. Standard Engle-Granger cointegration tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration; however, once allowance is made for an endogenous break in the cointegrating relationship,
the weak form of the Ricardian equivalence proposition is supported. 相似文献
87.
The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules
and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party
alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political
environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider
our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature.
Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected
to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Public Choice Society Meetings. The authors would like to thank
the conference participants, William Shughart, Charles Register, Jocelyn Evans, John D. Jackson, Amihai Glazer, and two anonymous
referees for their comments. We would also like to thank Craig R. Stiller for his help in the collection of data. Any remaining
errors remain the responsibility of the authors. 相似文献
88.
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal.
We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that
candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium
to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure
alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election.
In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative
will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible
in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington,
Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson,
Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial
support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at
Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality
is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
89.
汽车制造商和零件供应商可以节省巨大开支,但前提是双方要更为紧密地合作在一起麦肯锡的研究表明,北美汽车业每年在产品开发和组装过程中由于汽车生产商与供应商缺乏良好的计划和协调不当,造成了超过100亿美元的浪费。事实上.这只是较为保守的估算。因为我们的研究仅涵盖了供应商发生的成本,如:附加设计、生产工具最后改型和零件自身的附加成本。这还不包括因设计问题生产商需额外支付的改型费用、生产问题引发的车辆最终成本的增加或质保支出。这几项每年给汽车行业带来的浪费约为120亿美元。 相似文献
90.