The Debt/Equity Swap in Latin America– In Whose Interest?

This paper presents the basic analytics of a debt/equity swap and illustrates the concept with a detailed example of American Express Bank's swap transactions that began in 1986 and have resulted in construction of seven hotels in Mexico during the course of the swap agreement. The economics of the swap are presented from the lending bank's view, from the foreign direct investor's view, and from the borrowing country's view. It is concluded that: swaps offer net benefits to the borrower country when additional investment is generated (from the swap transaction itself and/or from encouraging further investment as a result of the swap policy); they offer net benefits to the lender when future loan servicing prospects are poor and viable investment opportunities exist; and they offer net benefits to the direct investor when the cost of financing the investment through the swap is less than for alternative financing sources.
The analytical framework presented here allows the bank lender to formally compare alternatives of holding impaired LDC loans on its books, selling the loans in the secondary market, trading the loans for loans from another country, and swapping the loans for equity investments in the borrowing country. It similarly allows the government policymaker to compare the relevant economic costs and benefits of swaps, so that better swap policies can be developed.     

Pricing Options on an Asset with Bernoulli Jump-Diffusion Returns

The price movements of certain assets can be modeled by stochastic processes that combine continuous diffusion with discrete jumps. This paper compares values of options on assets with no jumps, jumps of fixed size, and jumps drawn from a lognormal distribution. It is shown that not only the magnitude but also the direction of the mispricing of the Black-Scholes model relative to jump models can vary with the distribution family of the jump component. This paper also discusses a methodology for the numerical valuation, via a backward induction algorithm, of American options on a jump-diffusion asset whose early exercise may be profitable. These cannot, in general, be accurately priced using analytic models. The procedure has the further advantage of being easily adaptable to nonanalytic, empirical distributions of period returns and to nonstationarity in the underlying diffusion process.     

Action Teams That Work

A growing awareness of workplace hazards and identification of airborne contaminants, coupled with a changing safety and health regulatory environment, created an unexpected demand for new and innovative respirators in the early 1980s. 3M's Occupational Health and Environmental Safety Division broke new ground by taking the team concept further than ever before in the company. The division's Action Teams successfully designed, built and introduced products in less than half the time it would have taken previously. Robert Hershock, Charles Cowman and Douglas Peters describe how 3M learned important lessons about team selection, training, performance and motivation, the importance of project sponsors, and the role of middle management.     

Further Ambiguity When Performance Is Measured by the Security Market Line

This paper employs the optimality conditions for expected utility and mean-variance portfolio problems to examine the ambiguities associated with the security market line criterion both at a point in time and through time. At a point in time, we show that the security market line criterion can be irrelevant, even in meanvariance economies. In a multiperiod setting, we show that the analysis of performance based on portfolio choice is inconsistent with the analysis based on return generating models. Empirical work suggests that the inconsistency can lead to dramatically different estimates of a security's required return.     

在衰退中成长

如今,全球都笼罩在经济衰退之中.如果下一个就要轮到贵公司,你该怎么办?当然你要尽力保证企业财务的稳定.但更重要的是,你还必须了解公司在衰退结束后的目标设计.如果你知道企业的发展方向和如何实现这一目标,那么衰退时期是改善公司相对战略地位的好时机.     

The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.