The Stability of Tax Elasticities over the Business Cycle in European Countries

We estimate short‐ and long‐run tax elasticities that capture the relationship between changes in national income and tax revenue. We show that the short‐run tax elasticity changes according to the business cycle. We estimate a two‐state Markov‐switching regression on a novel data set of tax policy reforms in 15 European countries from 1980 to 2013, showing that the elasticities during booms and recessions are statistically (and often economically) different. The elasticities of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions tend to be larger during recessions. Estimates of long‐run elasticities are in line with existing literature.     

Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects

We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.     

Territorial Rooting as an Element of Well-Being

The paper discusses the relevance of the idea of rooting as proposed by Simone Weil and builds a social economic framework to study its role in our life. Rooting is connected to the need of belonging and to have an identity. These elements are identified in some different areas of research—social psychology and social economy—to analyze how this need of the person is taken into account. Then, a theoretical framework to study rooting is presented developing the concept of plural utility and capabilities. The end is to discuss one of the neglected dimensions of human needs in the context of modern society. Finally, some conclusion concerning both individual choices related to rooting and well-being will be proposed.     

Public happiness in today’s economics

This paper illustrates the significance of revisiting the idea of public happiness today, by briefly discussing recent contributions, some of which appeared in the IREC review.     

Moonlighting politicians

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. At the same time, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in terms of voting attendance.     

Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning,market, and organizations

Herbert A. Simon acknowledged Friedrich A. Hayek as a founder of the notion of bounded rationality; yet Simon considered Hayek’s perspective incomplete, and, more in general, their views on market mechanisms, planning, and organization exhibit considerable differences. The comparison between these authors sheds light on Simon’s interpretation of planning, which emerges within his theory of organization (and not in traditional debates on socialism). Contrary to Hayek, he maintained that planning, in specific circumstances, is more advantageous than the market; and in both administration and organization, it involves a decentralized structure based on near independent sub-units. Decentralization of decisions also appears in social planning, which evolves through continuous interactions among planners (i.e., agents and institutions), and it is a process connoted by the absence of “fixed goals”. Finally, Simon defined modern economies more in terms of “organizational economies” than in those of “market economies” and this highlights a further difference with respect to the Austrian economist. This leads to analysis of the nature of organizations as hierarchical and “near-decomposable” structures, which refers to Simon’s theory of complexity and gives an epistemological explanation to the relation between centralization and decentralization.     

When counterfeits raise the appeal of luxury brands

Counterfeiting is a widespread practice throughout the world. The conventional wisdom is that it affects branded goods negatively. In this paper, however, we suggest that counterfeiting may actually benefit certain luxury brands. By means of two studies, we show how the market presence of luxury counterfeit items can increase consumers’ willingness to pay for original brands. In Study 1, we show that the presence of luxury counterfeits can increase consumers’ willingness to pay for well-known original brands, but not for lesser-known ones. Brand awareness plays a moderating role in the positive relationship between counterfeiting and willingness to pay (WTP). In Study 2, we address the psychological mechanisms that explain this increased willingness to pay. The results show that consumers’ (a) pleasure at being envied, (b) pleasure in distinguishing themselves, and (c) perception of the quality of the original goods fully mediate the relation between the presence of counterfeit in the market and consumers’ WTP for originals. We subsequently discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of the two study results.