To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets

In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Games Econ. Behavior2, 29–46). In their duopoly game firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1, it does not know whether the other firm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a firm can observe the other firm's period-1 action. Hamilton and Slutsky predicted the emergence of endogenous Stackelberg leadership. Our data, however, do not confirm the theory. While Stackelberg equilibria are extremely rare, we often observe endogenous Cournot outcomes and sometimes collusive play. This is partly driven by the fact that endogenous Stackelberg followers learn to behave in a reciprocal fashion over time, i.e., they learn to reward cooperation and to punish exploitation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43.     

Living on the slopes: entrepreneurial preparedness in a context under continuous threat

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine how entrepreneurs living in communities under continuous threat prepare themselves to continue with their enterprising activities or engage in new ones after the expected crisis occurs. Most of the crisis literature on disasters and entrepreneurship focuses on aftermath responses, but the antecedents of such entrepreneurial behaviour and its connection to past and future crises remains largely unexplored. Based on a two-stage exploratory study pre and post the Calbuco Volcano eruptions in 2015 and 2016 in Chile, we introduce the notion of entrepreneurial preparedness in a context of continuous threat and elaborate on its four central attributes: anchored reflectiveness, situated experience, breaking through, and reaching out. Subsequently, our work develops a refined understanding of pre and post-disaster entrepreneurship and offers a novel base for theorizing on the relationship between entrepreneurial preparedness in contexts of continuous threat.     

On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation

We examine changes in the compensation of CEOs of German firms after the prohibition of insider trading (IT) in 1994 to test whether IT is a relevant compensation device. While we find that the performance elasticity of explicit CEO pay slightly increases subsequent to the IT law adoption for non-financial firms indicating an incentive-substitution effect, the overall change in levels seems modest. We explore the hypothesis that compensation for forgone IT profits in general is small because typically, firms lack at least one of the two necessary conditions for profitable IT: the existence of a liquid stock market imposing low costs of transactions and the presence of a small number of co-insiders, preventing the information rent to be competed away. Based on a difference-in-difference estimation, we indeed find that explicit pay increases more strongly for intensely traded firms and decreases for non-financial firms and insurance companies with a higher number of co-insiders. The combined effect is relatively small except for firms with the most liquid shares.     

On the profitability of collusion in location games

In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable. The results have immediate implications for mergers in spatial markets.     

Können Unternehmen durch Cluster Wettbewerbsvorteile realisieren? Eine ressourcenbasierte Analyse des Uhrenclusters Glashütte

Single firms as parts of clusters are in the focus of this paper. They are analysed with regard to their contribution to the generation of firm- and cluster-specific competitive advantages. The resource-based view is extended to ensure applicability in cluster research. This approach serves as the basis for the analysis of a case study undertaken in 2008 in the watch cluster in Glashütte, Germany.     

Economic preferences and trade outcomes

Review of World Economics - Integrating the Global Preference Survey (GPS) and its data of unique scope on national preference structures in patience, risk attitude and reciprocity into a gravity...     

Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts,risk premia,and access options

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk...     

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