Divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty

This paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty. The role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non-state contingent. In this context incentive contracts achieve expected Stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm's responsiveness to demand shocks. Divisionalization, on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks.     

A comparison of the constant-order and dual-index policy for dual sourcing

We analyze a single-product, periodic-review, stochastic demand inventory model with backorders and two supply options, a regular and a more expensive expedited one, with deterministic, offsetting lead times. Since the optimal policy for such a problem is generally unknown, several simpler policies have been proposed in the literature, e.g., the single-index (SIP), dual-index (DIP), or constant-order policy (COP). In previous research the DIP has been found to perform closely to the optimal policy in specific numerical settings. The COP, on the other hand, is very appealing from a practical point of view. We explore the relative cost performance of these two policies in a numerical study to gain insights into appropriate policy choices. We find that in settings, where dual sourcing is most valuable, the simpler COP delivers satisfactory results, sometimes even better ones than the DIP, and therefore represents a legitimate policy alternative for practical situations.     

Plant-level employment development before collective displacements: comparing mass layoffs,plant closures and bankruptcies

This article analyzes the development of employment levels and worker flows before bankruptcies, plant closure without bankruptcies and mass layoffs. Utilizing administrative plant-level data for Germany, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcies. Employment reductions in closing plants, in contrast to bankruptcies and mass layoffs, do not come along with increased worker flows. These patterns point to an intended and controlled shrinking strategy for closures without bankruptcy and to an unintended collapse for bankruptcies and mass layoffs.     

Entrepreneurship as translation: Understanding entrepreneurial opportunities through actor-network theory

Entrepreneurship scholars argue that opportunities are at the heart of entrepreneurial activity. Yet, there is still a heated debate on the nature of opportunities. The discovery view argues that opportunities are discovered and have objective existence prior to the entrepreneurial process. The creation view argues that the discovery view is incomplete and makes wrongful assumptions about agency, process and opportunities in entrepreneurship. More conceptual development, however, is needed for the creation view to become a fully developed theoretical alternative to the discovery view. In this article, Actor-Network Theory is used to develop the creation view and further our understanding of entrepreneurial processes.     

Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t

Summary. In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.Received: 14 October 2002, Revised: 1 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43. Correspondence to: Hans-Theo Normann     

Aggregate information cascades

We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises.     

Rationing and rationality

This paper investigates a simple three-good two-sector macromodel with fixed prices. In order to omit any ad hoc assumptions about the market outcomes we analyse the model as a game played by (fully) rational players. Whereas the notion of rationality underlying the concept of Nash equilibria implies a multiplicity of solutions (with different trades and different excess demands) the refined notion of uniformly perfect equilibria yields uniqueness. Interestingly, the unique solution implies excess demands differing from previously discussed suggestions. Accordingly, the amount of involuntary unemployment may here be different from those in former models even though transactions are the same. In principle, the model provides a reasonable basis to interpret the magnitude of excess demands, what seems important since excess demands serve as signals not only for markets but also for policy makers.     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.