The effect of globalization on union bargaining and price-cost margins of firms

In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic integration. This paper analyzes how increased economic integration has affected labor and product markets. We use a panel of Belgian manufacturing firms to estimate price-cost margins and union bargaining power and show how various measures of globalization affect them. Import competition puts pressure on both markups and union bargaining power, especially when there is increased competition from low wage countries. This suggests that increased globalization is associated with a moderation of wage claims in unionized countries, which should be associated with positive effects on employment.

Competition in the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies

Competition in the financial sector, as in other sectors, mattersfor allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency. Theory suggests,however, that unfettered competition is not necessarily bestgiven the special features of financial services. The authordiscusses these analytical complications before reviewing howto assess competition in the financial sector and its determinants.It is shown that competitiveness varies greatly across countries,in perhaps surprising ways, and that it is not driven by financialsystem concentration. Rather, systems with greater foreign entryand fewer entry and activity restrictions tend to be more competitive,confirming that contestability—the lack of barriers toentry and exit—determines effective competition. The authorthen analyzes how competition policy in the financial sectorhas generally been conducted and how changes in competitionin the financial services industries should affect competitionpolicy going forward. In part based on comparison with otherindustries, the author provides some suggestions on how competitionpolicy in the financial sector could be better approached aswell as what institutional arrangements best fit a modern viewof competition policy in the sector. The specific competitionchallenges for developing countries is also highlighted. Theauthor concludes that practices today fall far short of theneed for better competition policy in the financial sector. JEL codes: G10, G18, G28, L1, L5     

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

Estimating the costs and benefits of soil conservation in Europe

Economics is about problems of choice. In erosion control, both public authorities and private land users are faced with such problems. What is the impact of erosion, both on-site and off-site, and to what extent can this impact be quantified? If we conceptualize this impact in terms of sustainability, how can we compare one type of effect against another? The former question can be answered only by natural scientists, the latter by economists and other social scientists. Weighing different aspects of sustainability requires value judgments, and economists are sometimes accused of having a jaundiced view of reality, wrongly supposing that decisions are based on rationality and denying the importance of emotion.However, let us assume that there is some mileage to be gained out of attempting to estimate the cost of erosion in an economic sense—which consists of converting the various effects into a common denominator: euros. If we can predict the impact of erosion control measures on erosion rates, we can know the benefit of these measures. The cost also needs to be calculated, not in terms of money but in terms of resources expended (which could have been used for other purposes) and in terms of possible negative impacts of erosion control (for instance, increased use of herbicides in reduced-tillage systems).There are important other considerations which economists may study. Firstly, there is the comparison of present versus future costs and benefits: how much can we sacrifice today for higher sustainability tomorrow?Secondly, there is the issue of private versus public costs and benefits: how do the goals of private land users differ from (those of?) the public good, how can this help us to predict land users’ behaviour, and what incentives would be appropriate to make them behave in such a way as to maximize the public good? Thirdly, how do we deal with uncertainty and risk?These problems loomed large in a study to support an extended impact assessment for the EU Soil Thematic Strategy, in 2005. Whereas much research has been done on erosion and its impact, much of this is on a small scale. The extent of the problem on a national, let alone a continental or a global scale, is still poorly known. The paper discusses how these problems were faced, which is not the same as saying they were resolved.     

How much does household collateral constrain regional risk sharing?

We construct a new data set of consumption and income data for the largest US metropolitan areas, and we show that the extent of risk-sharing between regions varies substantially over time. In times when US housing collateral is scarce nationally, regional consumption is about twice as sensitive to income shocks. We also document higher sensitivity in regions with lower housing collateral. Household-level borrowing frictions can explain this new stylized fact. When the value of housing relative to human wealth falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines, and the sensitivity of consumption to income increases. Our model aggregates heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households into regions characterized by a common housing market. The resulting regional consumption patterns quantitatively match those in the data.