Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies

More than regulations, laws on the books, or voluntary codes,enforcement is key to creating an effective business environmentand good corporate governance, at least in developing countriesand transition economies. A framework is presented to help explainenforcement, the impact on corporate governance when rules arenot enforced, and what can be done to improve corporate governancein weak enforcement environments. The limited empirical evidencesuggests that private enforcement tools are often more effectivethan public tools. However, some public enforcement is necessary,and private enforcement mechanisms often require public lawsto function. Private initiatives are often also taken underthe threat of legislation or regulation, although in some countriesbottom-up, private-led initiatives preceded and even shapedpublic laws. Concentrated ownership aligns incentives and encouragesmonitoring, but it weakens other corporate governance mechanismsand can impose significant costs. Various steps can be takento reduce these costs and reinforce other corporate governancemechanisms. But political economy constraints, resulting fromthe intermingling of business and politics, often prevent improvementsin the enforcement environment and the adoption and implementationof public laws.      

International shipping traffic as a determinant of the growing use of advertisements by local shopkeepers: a case study of eighteenth century Ghent

In this article we examine the quantitative growth of growing number of advertisements (ads) placed by local shopkeepers in the three-daily chronicle of Ghent between 1706 and 1800. We test whether this evolution can be explained by international (shipping) commerce, a determinant to which the literature seems to have paid less attention. In this period, the number of commercial ads placed by local shopkeepers increased strongly. The nature of the offered goods, Ordinary Least squares/Generalized method of moments (OLS/GMM) regressions and Granger-causality tests give convergent indications that this was determined by increasing international trade (on top of other factors). The intuition is that, as a result of the policy of the Austrian government to facilitate accessibility and hence reducing transportation costs, there was an inflow of new goods into the Southern Netherlands. Local shopkeepers in Ghent were supplied with more and new imported goods and increased their vending efforts by making use of commercial advertisements.     

Career lesbians. Getting hired for not having kids?

Using a field experiment, we investigate whether discrimination based on women's sexual orientation differs by age and family constraints. We find weakly significant evidence of discrimination against young heterosexual women. This effect is driven by age (and fertility) rather than by motherhood. We do not find any unequal treatment at older ages. This age effect is consistent with our theoretical expectation that, relative to lesbian women, young heterosexual women are penalised for getting children more frequently and taking on, on average, more at‐home‐caring tasks.     

Vertical control of a distribution network—an empirical analysis of magazines

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions, we develop two empirical entry models. In the benchmark coordinated entry model, the upstream firm sets market‐specific wholesale prices and implements the first best. In the more realistic restricted/free entry model, the upstream firm only sets a uniform wholesale price. As a second‐best solution, it restricts entry in markets where business stealing (encroachment) is high, and allows free entry elsewhere. We apply the model to magazine distribution, and assess the profitability of alternative vertical restraints. Banning restricted licensing reduces profits only slightly, so the business rationale for restricted licensing should not be sought in the prevention of encroachment. Furthermore, market‐specific wholesale prices implement the first best, but the profit increase would be small, providing a rationale for the commonly observed uniform wholesale prices. Finally, uniform franchise fees are much less effective than a uniform wholesale price to cope with local market differences.     

Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence

We provide a framework to interpret the recent literature on financial development and inequality. In many developing countries, access to funding and financial services by firms and households is still very skewed. Recent evidence suggests that poor access does not only reflect economic constraints but also barriers erected by insiders. Inequality affects the distribution of political influence, so financial regulation often is easily captured by established interests in unequal countries. Captured reforms deepen rather than broaden access, as small elites obtain most of the benefits while risks are socialized. Financial liberalization motivated to increase access may in practice increase fragility and inequality, and lead to political backlash against reforms. Thus financial reforms may succeed only if matched by a buildup in oversight institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 748–773.     

Employment equity policy frames in the literature: ‘good practice’ versus ‘bad idea’

Work organisations considering policies against racial or ethnic discrimination and for recognising diversity can find many different and often conflicting recommendations in the literature, in particular regarding the aim of proportional representation of different ethnic groups. To better understand this controversy, this paper rigorously examines three key theories from a frame-critical and business ethics perspective. It introduces a fundamental threefold conceptualisation of ‘employment equity policy’ (EEP) as a catch-all term for related concepts such as ‘affirmative action’, ‘equal opportunities policy’ and ‘diversity management’, distinguishing between three different organisational goals: equal treatment, equal results and individual recognition. The analysis suggests that different authors emphasise some ‘facts’ rather than others and strategically interpret the limited available empirical research to support their policy positions, mixing both classical and newer ethical reasoning. In the ‘good practice’ frame, human resource management practitioners are urged to take ‘positive action’, to monitor the ethnic composition of the workforce and to formulate target figures to increase the representation of discriminated groups. In the opposing ‘bad idea’ frame, organisations are seriously advised against EEPs with ‘hard’ numerical goals: these policies supposedly are unnecessary and ineffective and have negative unintended consequences. The article draws implications from these findings for future research and practice in the field of EEPs.     

Return Behavior in Emerging Stock Markets

This article investigates the behavior of stock returns in thetwenty stock markets represented in the International FinanceCorporation's Emerging Markets Data Base. The aim is to testfor return anomalies and predictability. Using statistical methodologiesthat have identified seasonal and size-based return differences,as well as general return predictability in industrial markets,we find that these emerging markets display few of the sameanomalies. In particular, we find limited evidence of turn-of-the-tax-yeareffects and small-firm effects. We do find, however, evidenceof return predictability.     

Technological change and the growing inequality in managerial compensation

Three of the most fundamental changes in US corporations since the early 1970s have been (1) the increased importance of organizational capital in production, (2) the increase in managerial income inequality and pay-performance sensitivity, and (3) the secular decrease in labor market reallocation. Our paper develops a simple explanation for these changes: a shift in the composition of productivity growth away from vintage-specific to general growth. This shift has stimulated the accumulation of organizational capital in existing firms and reduced the need for reallocating workers to new firms. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract when firms accumulate organizational capital but risk-averse managers cannot commit to staying with the firm. A calibrated version of the model reproduces the increase in managerial compensation inequality and the increased sensitivity of pay to performance in the data over the last three decades. This increased sensitivity of compensation to performance provides large, successful firms with the glue to retain their managers and the organizational capital embedded in them.