Adaptive diffusion models for the growth of robotics in New York state industry

Forecasts are developed for the diffusion of robotics in the state of New York through the year 2015. The chief objective is to compare static approaches with dynamic models for forecasting diffusion processes of various time horizons. Results for a Bass-Mansfield model are compared to those for a dynamic time-varying parameter model. The results indicate the advantages and disadvantages of a robust heuristic approach which smooths data as opposed to providing an optimal fit.     

Book Reviews

M. Arsjad Anwar, Thee Kian Wie, Iwan Jaya Azis, Pemikiran, Pdaksanaan, dan Perintisan Pembangunan Ekonomi[Concepts, Implementation, and Pioneering in Economic Development], Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia and PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 1992, pp. xx + 700.

Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, and Westview, Boulder, 1994, pp. 370. Paper: A$24.95.

East Asia Analytical Unit, Expanding Horizons: Australia and Indonesia into the 22st Century,Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1994, pp. xviii + 346. A$34.95.

Sjahrir, Pikiran Politik[Political Ideas], LP3ES, Jakarta, 1994, pp. xiv + 191.

Sjahrir, Persoalan Ekonomi Indonesia: Moneter, Perkreditan dan Nenca Pembayaran[Problems of the Indonesian Economy: Money, Credit and the Balance of Payments], Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1995, pp. xv + 205.

Sjahrir, Analisis Bursa Efek[Analysis of the Stock Exchange], PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 1995, pp. xiv + 169.

Sjahrir, Ekonomi Indonesia dalam Perspektif Bisnis[The Indonesian Economy in a Business Perspective], PT Jurnalindo Aksara Grafika, Jakarta, 1994, pp. xvi + 239.

Sjahrir, Kebijakan Negara Mengantisipasi Masa Depan[National Policy: Anticipating the Future], Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta, 1994, pp. xv + 251.

Sjahrir, Formasi Mikro-Makro Ekonomi Indonesia[Indonesia's Macro and Micro Economy], Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1995, pp. xii + 313

F.B.A. Bouman and Otto Hospes, Financial Landscapes Reconstructed: The Fine Art of Mapping Development,Westview, Boulder, 1994, pp. xi + 416. US$45.00

Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880–1942,Verhandelmgen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 163, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1994, pp. xiii + 295.

Shinya Sugiyama and Milagros C. Guerrero (eds), International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Inierwar Period,Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph 39, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1994, pp. ix + 222.

W.L. Korthals Altes, Changing Economy in Indonesia. Volume 15: Prices (Non-Rice) 1814–1940,Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 175. Paper: Dfl. 48.00.     

Crafting a public image: An empirical study of the ethics of ghostwriting

Ghostwriting is viewed by some as a necessary element for crafting an effective public image. Defenders of ghostwriting see no ethical dilemma in the practice because the audience knows the speechgiver is not necessarily the speechwriter. Alernatively, those regarding ghostwriting as unethical view the practice as deceitful. This group argues that the audience does not recognize the employment of a speechwriter and thus a speechgiver relies on the words of another to fortify personal ethos. This article examines several positions regarding the ethics of ghostwriting and discusses an empirical study testing three major positions found in ghostwriting literature. Findings from the study indicate that respondents do recognize the use of speechwriters by certain individuals in certain circumstances.Linda A. Riley is a College Associate Professor in the Department of Marketing, College of Business Administration and Economics at New Mexico State University. She also serves as the Director of the Center for Economic Development Research and Assistance in the College of Business Administration and Economics.Stuart C. Brown is Assistant Professor of Rhetoric and Professional Communication in the English Department at New Mexico State University.     

An Application of Keaveney's Model of Service Switching Behaviour to GP Fundholders

The introduction of competition within the National Health Service (NHS), with the purchasers having a degree of choice among providers, has raised a variety of issues for buyer-supplier relationships. Purchasers, especially GP fundholders, have power in relation to their provider in the sense that they may ultimately take their custom elsewhere and by transferring their business, or part of their business, from one trust provider to another. As GP fundholders increase in number, and in confidence, this practice seems likely to grow. Using evidence from commercial markets, this article explains why fundholders might switch provider and the implications this has for hospital trusts.     

Clawbacks,Holdbacks, and CEO Contracting

“Clawbacks” are much discussed in the context of senior executive compensation, yet the discussion has largely ignored the presence of holdbacks that are already in place in many firms. Holdbacks are deferred compensation that is potentially foregone in the event that the CEO leaves the firm without good reason or they are dismissed for wrong‐doing. They are explicit or written features of a CEOs employment contract. Holdbacks are already in use at 70% of S&P 500 firms and average $18.4 million each. Firms with higher CEO replacement costs, greater information asymmetry, a recent bad experience (fraud, lawsuit, or restatement), or in more certain environments are more likely to have a holdback. In contrast, clawback adoptions are mainly driven by firms' bad experiences and external pressure from shareholders. Holdbacks and incentive‐based compensation are substitutes, as termination incentives can reduce the need for incentive compensation. As managers reasonably demand a premium for accepting risky compensation, a measure of abnormal compensation is positively associated with holdbacks, but there is no significant association between clawbacks and holdbacks. These findings suggest that the holdbacks many firms already have in place could help an “ex‐post settling up” in the event of financial misconduct, or even simply misstated financials. As companies have more control over the amounts held back ex‐ante, holdbacks are potentially more efficient.     

Keiretsu centrality — profits and profit stability: A power dependence perspective

Prior studies compare keiretsu member firm and independent firm performance. Here, we use historical and power dependence perspectives to theorize that the Japanese keiretsu system primarily benefits the most central firms. We test this by examining the performance of two types of keiretsu firms (central firms and other member firms) within two types of keiretsu (horizontal and vertical). We hypothesize and find that: (1) central vertical keiretsu firms are more profitable than central horizontal keiretsu firms; (2) central horizontal keiretsu firms have greater profit stability than central vertical keiretsu firms; (3) central vertical keiretsu firms are more profitable than non-central vertical keiretsu firms; and (4) central horizontal keiretsu firms have greater profit stability than non-central horizontal keiretsu firms. Implications for managers and future research directions are discussed.     

Business economics in a post-truth era

Business economists face increasing challenges at this political and policymaking juncture. “Experts” and economists are out of favor with the public and with certain policymakers. In response, business economists should be frank about our failures and the limits of our models. We can then be ready to defend truth against falsehood. In our defense of fact-based decision making, we must first assert that data matter, and the unbiased integrity of that data matters. We must support and defend the work of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Census Bureau. Business economists must be story tellers, transmitting historical memory of past crises, of past attacks on our profession and data sources (such President Nixon’s targeting of the Bureau of Labor Statistics).     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.