Third-country effects on the formation of free trade agreements

The recent proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships. The economics literature has generally examined the formation of FTAs as a function of the participating countries' economic characteristics alone. In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to enter into an FTA is also crucially dependent on the participating countries' existing FTA relationships with third countries. Accounting for the interdependence of FTAs helps to explain a significant fraction of FTA formations that would not otherwise be predicted by countries' economic characteristics.     

Periodic and chaotic programs of optimal intertemporal allocation in an aggregative model with wealth effects

Summary We examine a discrete-time aggregative model of discounted dynamic optimization where the felicity function depends on both consumption and capital stock. The need for studying such models has been stressed in the theory of optimal growth and also in the economics of natural resources. We identify conditions under which the optimal program is monotone. In our framework, the optimal program can exhibit cyclic behavior for all discount factors close to one. We also present an example to show that our model can exhibit optimal behavior which is chaotic in both topological and ergodic senses.We would like to thank V. Bala, J. Benhabib, P. Dasgupta, R. Day, L. W. McKenzie, K. Nishimura, S. Roy, and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

THE PRICING OF JOB CHARACTERISTICS WHEN MARKETS DO NOT CLEAR: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*

This article examines nonsequential search when jobs vary with respect to nonpecuniary characteristics. In the presence of frictions in the labor market, the equilibrium job distribution need not show evidence of compensating wage differentials. The model also generates several pervasive features of labor markets: unemployment and vacancies, apparent discrimination, and market segmentation. When workers are homogeneous, restrictions on the range of job offers decrease welfare and cannot reduce unemployment. However, when workers have heterogeneous preferences, such restrictions may lower unemployment, and can even lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare. We consider the impact of policies banning discrimination and regulating working conditions.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.     

Determinants of credit card delinquency and bankruptcy: Macroeconomic factors

In this paper, we examine how county unemployment rates affect consumers' delinquency and bankruptcy behavior by focusing on the credit card market. In particular, after controlling for credit supply and shocks like divorce and health coverage we investigate whether consumer propensity for delinquency and bankruptcy changes with respect to the macroeconomic fluctuations across counties. Our results show that county unemployment rates significantly influence delinquency. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of FleetBoston Financial.     

Mergers and synergy: Lessons from contemporary telecommunications history

Using contemporary historical data, the analysis reported in this article has evaluated the impact of the various mergers of the local exchange companies that took place between 1988 and 2001 on financial performance. Performance was measured using an important metric normally used to measure synergies of firms undergoing mergers. The analysis has revealed that the relative cash flow variable for firms worsened after mergers. If the synergy motive had been primary in influencing merger decisions, and also approvals, then the past mergers approved led to decreased performance levels and corresponding welfare losses for American consumers; thus, the mergers of communications common carriers were not in the interest of the public, the shareholders and customers. On the other hand, given the negative outcomes, views that the quiet life, hubris or a quest for possible market power motivated the mergers could be discarded. The lessons of such contemporary historical analysis have suggested that antitrust oppositions to contemporary telecommunications sector mergers may have basis in fact and salient evidence.     

REGULATIONS AND STRATEGY: EVIDENCE ON ADVERTISING

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firms’ advertising spending among the population of local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the hybrid rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have a negative relationship with advertising spending. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes has had a positive and significant impact on firms’ advertising spending. These results highlight the importance of incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to be market oriented and strive for superior performance.     

BILATERALISM AND FREE TRADE*

We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free‐trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free‐trade agreements. A profile of free‐trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements.     

Paragons of virtue? Competitor entry and the strategies of incumbents in the U.S. local telecommunications industry

We investigate whether the presence of new competitors has influenced the behaviour of U.S. incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) with respect to pricing, advertising and the extent of diversification that they engage in. This issue is explored empirically, using data for the major local exchange carriers for the years 1994 to 1998. The period straddles periods of both absence and presence of competition in the industry, since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has opened hitherto closed markets to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). While a recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report on local competition documents vigorous entry during the past years, the market share of the entrants is insubstantial. Our results indicate that the threat provided by market entrants has notably influenced the strategic behaviour of ILECs. The findings show that the incumbent U.S. local operators, particularly the larger ILECs, aggressively protect their profit streams from traditional business. The evidence demonstrates that the ILECs have responded to the Telecommunications Act 1996, and to the threat of market entry it has created, through entry deterrence. This strategic behaviour has been successful in providing ILECs with protection of their monopolistic markets so far.     

Scale efficiencies in US telecommunications: An empirical investigation

In this paper we evaluate scale efficiency patterns of local operating companies in the US telecommunications industry. Scale efficiency is defined as the ability of each company to operate as close to its most productive scale size as possible, and is calculated using data envelopment analysis. The analysis of scale efficiencies is conducted for a set of 39 local operating companies, over six time periods: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. During these time periods, several technical and institutional changes took place in the industry which are likely to have had an impact on the abilities of the companies to exploit feasible scale efficiencies, and we find that scale efficiencies have steadily increased over these time periods. We also establish that the Bell operating companies are no different from the independent companies in their ability to be scale efficient; single-state firms are relatively more scale efficient; line digitization, during the periods studied, has not significantly impacted scale efficiency; and firms belonging to multi-company parents are more scale efficient. Additionally, policy regime changes, such as the introduction of intra-LATA toll market competition and incentive regulation schemes, have positively impacted firms' abilities to attain scale efficiency, while micro-segment competition in local markets have, so far, not had the expected impact.