The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance*

In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:

• ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
• ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
• ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.

     

The Financial Crisis and the Death (or Hegemony) of Development Economics

Development economics was the study of how to create the plumbing that would allow developing economies to become developed. The financial crisis leads us to question whether industrialized countries have the plumbing problem solved and thus leads us to question whether we need a development economics that is separate from macroeconomics. Indeed, it even leads us to question whether development economics should take as its goal the creation of the institutional plumbing that industrialized countries currently have. The consequence will be a blending of concerns that have been central in developing economies with the standard macro models. The blending can be seen as either the death of development economics or the hegemony of development economics.     

The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System*

In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis—including “agency” problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms—at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving—to the extent possible and prudent—the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create “living wills” laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to “aggressively encourage” banks to issue “contingent” debt capital securities that convert into equity.     

HR flexibility and firm performance: analysis of a multi-level causal model

Human resource flexibility as a construct, how it develops, and its effect on firm performance have not received adequate attention in strategic HRM literature in spite of their obvious importance in today's dynamic competitive environment. Based on a study of 98 manufacturing and 103 service firms in India, this paper addresses these issues by developing and testing a multi-level model that attempts to explore the ‘black box’ of the interlinkages between the various components of HR flexibility and firm-level human, operational, and financial outcomes. The results suggest that a certain set of ambidextrous HR practices constitute a distinct dimension of HR flexibility, beyond the dimensions of flexibilities of skill, behaviour and HR practices as already identified in the existing literature. Evidences from both manufacturing and service sectors support the notion of HR value chain that suggests that HR system has a direct impact on firm-level HR outcomes which are most proximal, and its effects on increasingly more distal operational and financial outcomes are mediated by HR outcomes that it produces. Another important finding is that HR practices as a system have both direct and indirect (mediated by behavioural flexibility) effects on firm-level HR outcomes. Existence of significant direct effects highlights the important role that HR practices play as a structural mechanism in achieving superior firm performance.     

DEBT, FOLKLORE, AND CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

Conventional wisdom has long held that, in relationship-based economies such as Japan and Germany, corporations are able to borrow more than U.S. companies, which in turn reduces their cost of capital and gives them a competitive edge. But such folklore does not stand up to scrutiny. In Japan and Germany, large businesses do not borrow more than U.S. companies–and, in fact, judging from coverage ratios, German companies (as well as U.K. companies) seem to borrow considerably less than their international competitors.
The article also reports that, in countries where financial markets are "transparent," the development of the banking sector has little additional impact on the growth of "financially dependent" industries. That is, although industries that require a lot of external finance grow faster in countries where the bank credit-to-GDP ratio is high, the growth rates of such industries are much more correlated with the level of accounting standards (with high standards serving as a proxy for well-developed capital markets) than with a strong banking system.     

Learning under supervision: an experimental study

In many market environments, for example in investment banking, salesforce management and others, workers and supervisors work closely as a team. Workers are paid a fixed salary and supervisors determine any raises, which are typically dependent on how well the organization does. In such scenarios, a supervisor who constantly offers suggestions can create a problem—typically a worker cannot ignore his supervisor’s advice, yet if such advice is wrong and is followed, it will only decrease firm profits. We conduct a laboratory experiment to address a question critical for such settings—does the relationship between advisor and worker interfere with the learning abilities of the worker? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, subjects who have a supervisor advising them and whose advice is costly to ignore actually learn better than those with an advisor whose advice can be ignored. An even more striking result is that advisees as well as advisors in both these conditions learn better than subjects with no advisors. Our result can be attributed to the presence of advice and has direct relevance to learning in many environments.