A Theory of Bank Capital

Banks can create liquidity precisely because deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased uncertainty makes deposits excessively fragile, creating a role for outside bank capital. Greater bank capital reduces the probability of financial distress but also reduces liquidity creation. The quantity of capital influences the amount that banks can induce borrowers to pay. Optimal bank capital structure trades off effects on liquidity creation, costs of bank distress, and the ability to force borrower repayment. The model explains the decline in bank capital over the last two centuries. It identifies overlooked consequences of having regulatory capital requirements and deposit insurance.     

Unconventional monetary policy and the role of central banks

Over the last few years, central banks in industrial countries have undertaken a variety of policies that deviated from ordinary monetary policy. Why were these policies used? Did they work? What will be the effect of phasing them out? And what long-term concerns do they raise? Clearly, markets were broken, and there was a need to repair them. Some of these innovative instruments seemed to have worked quite well. But now central banks are struggling to get inflation up into their target bands. Large central bank balance sheets may create needed safe, short-term instruments, but take much liquidity management away from the private sector, while tempting governments to use them for other purposes. Sober thinkers need to examine the experience of the last few years and ask again, what should central banks be asked to do and what ought to be the range of actions they can take?     

Making Capitalism Work for Everyone

Capitalism–or, more precisely, the free enterprise system–is the most effective system for allocating resources and rewards. For this reason, most economists tend to believe that capitalism is bound to spread from the U.S. to all parts of the world. But the authors argue that the triumph of capitalism is far from certain. Part of the problem is that the forms of capitalism that are experienced in most countries are very far from the ideal. They are a corrupt version in which vested interests prevent competition from playing its socially bene. cial role. What's more, as many economists fail to recognize, and as has become clear from the experience of many countries in recent years, a market system cannot. ourish without the very visible hand of the government, which is needed to set up and maintain the infrastructure that enables participants to trade freely and with con. dence. But this in turn gives rise to a political, or collective action, problem: Even though we all bene. t from the better goods and services and the equality of access that competitive markets make possible, no one in particular makes huge pro. ts from keeping the system competitive and the playing. eld level; everyone has an incentive to take a free ride and let someone else defend the system. In this sense, a competitive market is a form of public good, one in need of collective action to maintain it. In all nations, the main political threat to free markets comes from two very different groups: (1) “incumbents,” who want to retain their positions and thus have a strong incentive to suppress any potential source of competition; and (2) those who have lost out and would be happy if the rules of the game that caused their troubles were changed. The longterm feasibility of free markets depends on reducing the incentives and limiting the ability of both of these groups to work against the market. This can be accomplished not by expanding the power of the state, but through policies –including a strengthening of the “safety net” as well as removal of barriers to the. ow of trade and capital–that end up limiting the state's ability to take inef. cient economic actions that favor the few at the expense of the majority.     

Earthquake risk and housing prices in Japan: Evidence before and after massive earthquakes

The hedonic pricing approach is used to examine whether homeowners and/or renters alter their subjective assessments of earthquake risks after massive earthquakes. Using nation-wide household panel data coupled with earthquake hazard information and records of observed earthquakes, we find that there are some modifications of individuals' assessments of earthquake risk in both cases. We have carefully taken into consideration the bias stemming from the use of objective risk variables as a proxy for individual risk assessments. Our results suggest that the price discount from locating within a quake-prone area is significantly larger soon after earthquake events than beforehand. We argue that the most likely interpretation for this result is that households tend to underestimate earthquake risk if there has not been a recent occurrence.