The inside scoop: Acceptance and rejection at the journal of international economics

There is little work on the inner workings of journals. What factors seem to affect the ability to publish in a journal? Could simple rules (which are already used by some journals) like the desk rejection of a significant minority of papers, help to streamline the process? At what cost? How well do journals seem to do in choosing papers? What can we say about the extent of type 1 and type 2 errors? Do editors seem to have uniform standards or are some harsher than others? We use data on submissions to the Journal of International Economics to help answer these questions.     

Protection for sale or surge protection?

This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman “protection for sale” model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.     

Simulation Analysis of a Dynamic Reallocation-based Routing Functionality for SAGE Application

A large amount of scientific data is generated through computation and analysis. Also, today’s scientific research necessitates an aggregation of diverse expertise from experts with different backgrounds. Therefore, visualizing and sharing these data among scientists in an intuitive and easy manner is of more importance in scientific collaborative research than ever. We have focused on SAGE, a middleware that realizes a large-scale remote visualization leveraging network streaming technique as a promising building block technology. However, no advanced network control function for efficient use of the network is equipped with SAGE although SAGE relies on a network streaming techniques. Our previous research integrated a functionality that detected network failures avoided such failure by rerouting network flows of SAGE into the functionality. Nonetheless, a network congestion avoidance functionality to adapt a collection of network flows generated by SAGE to the underlying network has not been developed yet. In this paper we explore the feasibility of a reallocation-based dynamic routing functionality for SAGE, with which all network flows on the network are rearranged. For feasibility research, we perform simulation experiments to observe the behavior of the functionality. The evaluation confirms that our proposed functionality works correctly and brings better throughput for each flow.     

REMARKS ON A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR THE VOTING PARADOX

Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007), 688–695] provides a generalization of the voting paradox by using the impotence‐partition condition. This paper aims to clarify his result by providing several remarks. We show that a main result of Schwartz can be strengthened by replacing strong Pareto by weak Pareto. We also discuss how the impotence partition is related to the standard concept of decisiveness, which is widely employed in the literature on social choice.     

The top-dog and the lean and hungry look strategies in endogenous entry

This paper examines the strategic commitment behavior of heterogeneous leaders in an endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that each leader's investment level is independent of the other leaders' characters. Furthermore, we show that a leader over-invests (resp. under-invests) when an investment increases (resp. decreases) the leader's marginal profitability. Such an investment always makes leaders employ aggressive strategies in the competition relative to those in a no-commitment case. This result implies that aggressiveness of leaders is a robust observation in an endogenous market structure.     

Leaders and competitors

The purpose of this article is to investigate the properties of equilibrium in a market with a leader. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium values depend on existing competitors. When the number of competitors is exogenously given, most equilibrium values, including the leader??s strategies, depend on the structure of the competitors: the number of incumbent competitors, their technologies, and their objective functions. In contrast, when an entry is endogenous, the equilibrium values, including not only the leader??s strategies but the entrants?? as well, are independent of such properties of the incumbent competitors. We provide several applications of our main result in industrial organization issues.     

Research Note: A High Resolution Graph Viewer for Multi-monitor Visualization Environment

Bigdata analysis is a hot topic in all fields of science. Particularly in scientific fields investigating data relations, observation and analysis of relation among diverse data sets has begun to play a role of great importance. A graph is a representative expression for the purpose and many graph viewers and tools prevail today. However, most of these graph viewers do not offer the capability for displaying graphs on a multi-monitor visualization environment, even though multi-monitor visualization environment facilitates scientists in understanding data in a more detailed and intuitive manner. In this paper, our first exploration towards a high resolution graph viewer for a multi-monitor visualization environment is explored and reported.