Interlinked credit and farm intensification: evidence from Kenya

This paper addresses the potential for interlinked credit/input/output marketing arrangements for particular cash crops to promote food crop intensification. Using panel survey data from Kenya, we estimate a household fixed-effects model of fertiliser use per hectare of food crops, using an instrumental variables approach for addressing the endogeneity of participation in interlinked credit arrangements. Results indicate that households engaging in interlinked marketing programs for selected cash crops applied considerably greater fertiliser on other crops (primarily cereals) not directly purchased by the cash crop trading firm. These findings suggest that, in addition to the direct stimulus that interlinked cash crop marketing arrangements can have on small farmer incomes, these institutional arrangements may provide spill-over benefits for the productivity of farmers' other activities such as food cropping.     

Indivisible labor implies chaos

Summary. We study a simple infinite horizon model with indivisible labor. We characterize the optimal plans under the assumptions that and that , where R is the gross interest rate and is the discount factor. We show that under those assumptions, optimal plans are almost always asymptotically nonperiodic unless initial wealth is excessively small or large. Received: May 25, 1999; revised version: June 24, 1999     

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.     

A One-Factor Conditionally Linear Commodity Pricing Model under Partial Information

A one-factor asset pricing model with an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process as its state variable is studied under partial information: the mean-reverting level and the mean-reverting speed parameters are modeled as hidden/unobservable stochastic variables. No-arbitrage pricing formulas for derivative securities written on a liquid asset and exponential utility indifference pricing formulas for derivative securities written on an illiquid asset are presented. Moreover, a conditionally linear filtering result is introduced to compute the pricing/hedging formulas and the Bayesian estimators of the hidden variables.     

On the Effects of Wage Pressure on the Unemployment Rate and Capital Share

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the capital share and the unemployment rate in Europe over the past quarter of a century. We consider a model with monopolistic competition, increasing returns and an imperfect labour market, assuming that the elasticity between capital and labour is less than unity. Previous works have generally assumed constant returns to scale. Our results offer an important conclusion, namely that increased wage pressure will increase the unemployment rate and the capital share even though the latter initially decreases, which fits the stylized facts about the studied economies.     

ON THE ROLE OF TAX SUBSIDY SCHEME IN MONEY SEARCH MODELS*

This article investigates the roles of policy in search models with divisible money. Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found in both specific and general search models with divisible money. Thus if we assume the divisibility of money, it would be quite difficult to make accurate predictions of the effects of simple monetary policies. Therefore, in this article, we introduce a certain tax subsidy scheme and show that this is effective in selecting a determinate efficient equilibrium. In other words, for a given efficient equilibrium and for any real number δ > 0 , a certain tax subsidy scheme induces a locally determinate equilibrium within the δ‐neighborhood of the given equilibrium. Moreover, the size of the tax subsidy can be arbitrarily small.     

Lattice structure of knowledge and agreeing to disagree

This paper is a contribution to the study of the underlying mathematical structure of common-knowledge, which gives the well-known result of Aumann about the impossibility of ‘agreeing to disagree’. We present the Bayesian subjective probability model with player's belief: i.e. a triple (? %plane1D;4AF;, μ), in which i is a player. ? is a lattice in the field of sets of a state space Ω, %plane1D;4AF;, is a correspondence assigning to each state ω a filter %plane1D;4AF;(ω) in ?, and μ is a common-prior. For this model, we impose none of the important restrictions on the information structure in the Aumann-Bacharach model: axiom of knowledge K₁. axiom of transparency K₂ and axiom of wisdom K₃. We can extend both the disagreement theorem of Aumann and the agreement theorem of Geanacoplos and Polemarchakis under the assumption that each ? is an Artinian lattice.