Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.     

South Korea’s finance–growth nexus: evidence from VARX analysis with financial crisis and openness

South Korea’s finance–growth nexus is empirically investigated by taking the elements of financial crisis and trade and financial openness through the newly developed approach of vector error-correction models (ECMs) with weakly exogenous I(1) variables (VARX). Considering financial development as a more complex phenomenon, we take into estimation two aspects of financial deepening that are measured by its size (private credit to GDP) and efficiency (private credit to total domestic deposits). The main findings are (1) financial efficiency contributes to accelerating economic growth; (2) the causality between economic growth and financial size is bilateral and negative; and (3) financial crisis is negative to both economic growth and financial development, whereas the growth-promoting effects of trade and financial openness are confirmed.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited

This paper proposes the use of Bayesian potential games as models of informationally decentralized organizations. Applying techniques in team decision problems by Radner (1962) , this paper characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of Bayesian potentials and demonstrates using examples that Bayesian potentials are useful tools for studying the efficient use of information in organizations.     

The impact of retirement on household consumption in Japan

Using monthly data from the Japanese Family Income and Expenditure Survey, we examine the impact of retirement on household consumption. We find little evidence of an immediate change in consumption at retirement, on average, in Japan. However, we find a decrease in consumption at retirement for low income households that is concentrated in food and work-related consumption. The availability of substantial retirement bonuses to a large share of Japanese retirees may help smooth consumption at retirement. We find that those households that are more likely to receive such bonuses experience a short-run consumption increase at retirement. However, among households that are less likely to receive a retirement bonus, we find that consumption decreases at retirement.     

Reorganization strategies and securities valuation under asymmetric information

This paper examines optimal reorganization strategies during financial distress and securities valuation under asymmetric information. We model strategic interactions between debtholders and equityholders in a game-theoretic setting that can accommodate the varying bargaining powers of the two claimants. Two reorganization strategies are considered: Chapter 11 (debt–equity swap) and private workout (strategic debt service). Using Chapter 11 as a costly state verification device, we characterize in equilibrium which firms choose Chapter 11 and which choose private workout. In particular, we show how the bank's belief about the type of firm evolves by observation of reorganization strategies. We also derive closed-form solutions to both the equity and debt valuation problems under asymmetric information and show that credit spreads increase with the degrees of asymmetric information.     

MODELS OF COMPETITION BETWEEN FIRMS: ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE KALECKIAN MODEL

The purpose of this paper is to incorporate free entry into the Kaleckian model. To this end, we consider a model with monopolistic competition, mark‐up pricing and a free‐entry condition. Using this model, the Kaleckian model is unstable under a wage‐led growth regime, and it is stable under a profit‐led growth regime, when the interest rate is supposed to be constant. Stability under a wage‐led growth can be achieved if the interest rate is allowed to respond positively to capacity utilization. We also find that a goods market policy, but not an income distribution policy, is then effective from an economic growth perspective.     

Ricardo on machinery: a dynamic analysis

I construct a dynamic two-sector model which formalizes Ricardo's argument on the effects of the introduction of machinery. My model does not require the inappropriate assumptions common to other Ricardian models. Using this model, I show that if machinery is introduced, both the demand for labour and the output of the consumption good must decline temporarily and can then recover. As well, the temporal decline of value of the gross produce is not a necessary condition for the above temporal decline of the demand for labour.