From real estate to consumption: the role of credit markets in the USA

The aim of this article is to test whether the credit market conditions affect the strength of transmission of real estate wealth effects on household consumption in the US economy. Although many different works have dealt with the analysis of the existence of a real estate wealth effect, most of them as a reaction to the dramatic increase of housing prices in several OECD countries, there are only few papers analysing whether the consumption response depends on the positive or negative sign of the wealth shock and, as far as we know, none of them takes the effects of credit market conditions on that asymmetric response into account. This article tries to fill the existing gap in the literature on this matter. From an econometric perspective, we estimate the asymmetries in the consumption response within the momentum threshold autoregressive model (M-TAR) proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001), but following Stevans (2004), it is applied to a multivariate framework. The main results show that the credit market conditions play a significant role in the transmission of changes in real estate wealth to consumption. In addition, we find that there exists an asymmetric behaviour in the US aggregate consumption spending responses to real estate wealth and credit market shocks, which is only significant when a negative shock takes place.     

Are traditional timing models well specified?

Traditional timing models are affected by several biases, which generate spurious timing and stock-picking coefficients. Academics have appointed different causes as the possible sources of these biases. A negative correlation between timing and stock-picking abilities arises as a consequence of the biases in traditional timing models. This article provides evidence for one bias commonly found in traditional timing models, which is related with options. We focus on this bias in view of the scant attention it has so far received in the literature. We believe one possible cause for this bias is the failure to include the cost of the option implicit in timing activities in the timing models, and on this basis, we opt for a corrected version of the Merton and Henriksson model (1981 Merton, RC and Henriksson, RD. 1981. On market timing and investment performance II: statistical procedures for evaluating forecasting skills. Journal of Business, 54: 513–34. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). This study therefore is a pioneer in the assessment of the magnitude of this bias and in the measurement of the impact of its correction on fund managers’ results. Our results confirm both the existence of the bias and the correction of the problem when the cost of the option is included in timing models. The modified version of the Merton and Henriksson model, unlike the traditional model, reports positive timing and stock-picking coefficients, supporting the good performance by managers.     

‘Adopt a Hypothetical Pup’: A Count Data Approach to the Valuation of Wildlife

The willingness to pay (WTP) for a coyote conservation program is estimated using a novel payment-vehicle, based on how many ‚problem’ coyotes respondents would be willing to sponsor for a year. This hypothetical scenario mimics an increasingly popular type of actual market. Data from a phone survey conducted in Prince Edward Island are analyzed using count data models that consider different processes explaining zero responses and the level of positive responses. This is particularly important in the case of coyotes, often regarded as an economic bad. Estimates of WTP per coyote per year around $18–$22 and annual WTP per contributor of about $46–$57 are obtained.      

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards.     

Strategic Environmental Standards, Wage Incomes and the Location of Polluting Firms

The purpose of this paper is tostudy how the choice of environmental standardsby governments is affected by the existence ofwage incomes when firms locations areendogenous. In developed countries labor isunionized, which allows positive wage incomesto arise. Thus, each government has incentivesto persuade firms to locate in its countrysince social welfare depends on suchincomes. But, as pollution damages theenvironment, each government will only try toattract polluting firms to thecountry, to obtain the wage incomes, whenthe valuation of environmental damage showsthat it is low.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Measuring Achievement and Shortfall Improvements in a Consistent Way

In measuring improvements over time of bounded variables, one can focus on achievements or shortfalls. However, rankings of alternative social states in terms of achievements and shortfalls do not necessarily mirror one another. We characterize axiomatically different families of achievement and shortfall improvement indices, and present the necessary and sufficient conditions under which they rank social states in a consistent way. Empirical illustrations using child mortality data from South Africa suggest that consistency between achievement and shortfall improvements in standards of living is not only a matter of theoretical import but is also a problem that can be encountered in practice to a large extent.