Code of ethics quality: an international comparison of corporate staff support and regulation in Australia,Canada and the United States

The objective of this paper is to examine the ‘Code of Ethics Quality’ (CEQ) in the largest companies of Australia, Canada and the United States. For this purpose, a proposed CEQ construct has been applied. It appears from the empirical findings that while Australia, Canada and the United States are extremely similar in their economic and social development, there may well be distinct cultural mores and issues that are forming their business ethics practices. A research implication derived from the performed research is that the construct provides a selection of observable and measurable elements in the context of CEQ. The construct of CEQ consists of nine measures divided into two dimensions (i.e. staff support and regulation). They should not be seen as a complete list. On the contrary, it is encouraged that others propose and elaborate revisions and extensions. A practical implication of this paper is a structure of what and how to examine the CEQ in a managerial setting. It may assist companies in their efforts to establish, maintain and improve their ethical culture, norms and beliefs within the organization and supporting them in their ethical business practices with different stakeholders in the marketplace and society. The dimensions and measures of the construct may be used as a frame of reference for further research. They may be useful and applicable across contexts and over time using similar samples when it comes to large companies, as small‐ or medium‐sized ones may not have considered all areas nor have the elements in place. This is a research limitation, but it provides an opportunity for further research.     

Discussion of “decentralized capacity management and internal pricing”

Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) study the role of transfer pricing and organizational choice in providing incentives for efficient decisions on the acquisition and subsequent reallocation of capacity within decentralized firms. Their analysis suggests that transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. They also find that symmetric responsibility center structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment incentives than hybrid organizations. An important condition for the derivation of the two results is the linearity of the shadow prices of capacity. If shadow prices are nonlinear, transfer prices should be below (above) the historical cost of capacity in order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Because profit center organizations can use transfer prices for mitigating the inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices, they offer a natural advantage over pure investment center organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions. Overall, these observations suggest that the curvature of profit functions is an important factor in determining the suitable instruments for decentralized capacity management.     

A Tale of Two Gate-Sharing Plans: The National Football League and the National League, 1952-1956

Do professional sports leagues design revenue-sharing rules primarily to help financially weaker teams, or do such organizations view revenue-sharing rules as ways to reward teams for being competitive? Baseball's National League and the National Football League provide evidence from the 1950s that revenue-sharing plans may have surprising effects. If strong teams draw well on the road, revenue-sharing plans may provide modest succor to teams in smaller cities and may benefit teams in larger cities. The two leagues' experiences also suggest that owners are willing to enact regressive aspects in their revenue-sharing plans, possibly to forestall moral hazard possibilities arising from automatically helping teams that remain poor draws or that fail to improve.     

'S Rijks vlottende schuld en de Nederlandsche Bank

Amsterdam, 6 Mei 1912.