International coordination of debt rules with time-inconsistent voters

In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting of several countries with varying degrees of present bias. A case wherein each country sets its own uncoordinated debt rules is compared with a case wherein all countries have common coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present-biased preferences increase their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present-biased preferences reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by participating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that countries with weak present-biased preferences have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.     

On the determinants of exporters' currency pricing: History vs. expectations

The purpose of this paper is to investigate why the choice of invoice currency under exchange rate uncertainty depends not only on expectations but also on history. The analysis is motivated by the fact that the US dollar has historically been the dominant vehicle currency in developing countries. The theoretical analysis is based on an open economy model of monopolistic competition. When the market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to set their prices not to deviate from those of the competitors. As a result, a coordination failure can lead the third currency to be a less efficient equilibrium invoice currency. The role of expectations is important in selecting the equilibrium in the static framework. However, in the dynamic model with staggered price-setting, the role of history becomes another key determinant of the equilibrium currency pricing. The role of history may dominate the role of expectations when the firms are myopic, particularly in the competitive local market. It also becomes dominant in the staggered price setting when a fraction of the new price setters are backward-looking. The result suggests the importance of history in explaining why the firm tends to choose the US dollar as vehicle currency. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (4) (2006) 548–568.     

GROWTH,STAGNATION AND STATUS PREFERENCE

We show that an economy grows or stagnates depending on which of three objects people most esteem as tokens of status. If the main object of status preference is consumption, then a steady state with full employment is reached. If it is physical capital (which is a producible asset), then permanent growth with full employment occurs. However, if it is money (which is not a producible asset), stagnation with persistent unemployment arises.     

Inequality and the politics of redistribution

This study analyzes the political economy of public education and in-cash transfer with an overlapping-generations model that features a two-class society. In this model, the dynamics of inequality are driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while private education, which supplements public education, is purchased individually. The model, which includes two-dimensional voting, yields the following two types of stable, steady-state equilibria: a high-inequality equilibrium with government expenditures favoring lump-sum transfers or a low-inequality equilibrium with such expenditures favoring public education.     

What determines firms’ intention to postpone product differentiation?

Abstract

In present-day Japan, more firms are beginning to apply postponed product differentiation in favor of providing mass-customized products. Mass customization can lead to competitive advantages in satisfying consumers’ individual needs. We propose a causal model to describe why and how Japanese distributors decide to postpone product differentiation and supply mass-customized products. The model was empirically tested by structural equation modeling with a dataset from Japanese automobile dealers, who have employed highly advanced mass customization systems and are world leaders in this practice. The results show that two environmental factors, uncertainty and innovation, affect firms’ expectations of their customers’ intentions to purchase mass-customized products and, in turn, firms’ decisions regarding postponing product differentiation in favor of mass customization. Mass customization has a high potential for growth in the future due to increasing levels of uncertainty and evolving forms of innovation.     

Capital gains tax and individual trading: The case of Japan

Japan implemented a capital gains tax reform and reduced its flat rate in 2003. This study attempts to explain how this has contributed to the recent surge of individual trading, using three different methods of analysis. First, we perform a time-series analysis with the aggregate, market-level data. Second, we use firm-level, by-stock data to conduct a similar time-series analysis, as well as a panel data analysis. Third, we examine the price-change sensitivity of winners’ volume before and after the reform. The results clearly indicate that the tax cut has helped expand individual trading, as the average tax rate negatively correlates significantly with individual trading.     

The role of mobile handsets in advanced network service evolution: Evidence from Japan

This paper aims at a better understanding of the mechanisms of mobile network service evolution through a closer examination of the context of mobile handsets. It aims first to establish quantitatively that mobile handsets are a determinant of mobile network service evolution patterns, and second, to develop a consistent perspective capable of explaining the evolution of various mobile network services. Despite the fact that mobile handsets are indispensable to users of mobile network services, surprisingly little is known about the role of these handsets in mobile network service evolution. This paper provides quantitative evidence of a positive relationship between intra-network-carrier penetration rates for mobile network service subscribers and mobile handsets designed for these services. The relationship is such that if one network service is diffused more than another, the mobile handsets related to the more diffused service are similarly more widely diffused in the market, and vice versa. The evidence is derived from an analysis of two mobile network services in Japan, mobile Internet and third generation mobile, initiated by NTT DoCoMo and KDDI. There are no existing studies that consistently explain the mechanisms of different mobile network service evolution patterns. Since the positive relationship that emerges from the analysis is consistent for both cases, by examining the mechanisms underlying this relationship, the paper develops an adequate and consistent perspective based on a constituent model reflecting the technological and competition structure of mobile network services. From this perspective, this positive relationship can be explained as the similarity or dissimilarity in essential technology ownership distribution across constituents. This perspective describes mobile network evolution in terms of changes in the distribution of essential technology ownership and, therefore, could be generalised more widely.     

Asymmetric oligopoly, international trade, and welfare: a synthesis

This paper analyzes the relationship between market shares and welfare under the assumption of Cournot-oligopolistic interdependence in production. The model is general enough to deal with multiple countries, oligopolists with different levels of marginal costs within each country, and any distribution of world demand across countries. It is found that the elimination of a minor firm harms the country if the country's total production is very little. However, such a policy always benefits the country if it exports the commodity. The welfare effect of production subsidies and the case of foreign ownership of firms are also discussed.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.