Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study

This paper examines the pricing behavior of securities of firms which repurchase their own shares. The results are consistent with a market in which investors price securities such that expected arbitrage profits are precluded. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive information, and that the market uses the premium, the target fraction and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement date. The observation that repurchases via tender offer are followed by abnormal increases in earnings per share and that mainly small firms engage in repurchase tender offers, provides further support for the signalling hypothesis.     

Distribution,taxation and employment in an open economy

Summary If taxes on labour income are passed on in wages the balanced budget multiplier may be negative. The present paper analyses this problem from a theoretical point of view applying a linearized version of a model for the small open economy. The model is dynamic, because account is taken of capital accumulation. Short-run and long-run solutions are expressed in terms of fiscal policy variables, a wage push variable, the price level abroad and world demand. Numerical examples are supplemented to illustrate the analytical results. Acknowledgement is due for his helpful comment to S.K. Kuipers     

Die Private Krankenversicherung im Fokus des Verfassungsrechts

Starting with the question as to the extent to which the state may interfere with economic interests at all, a brief historical overview is given through to the regulations currently in force. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) remains neutral on this issue so that the question cannot be discussed as to whether regulations are at all conceivable and admissible but how far these can go. The noteworthy parameters of the German law on intensifying competition in the statutory health insurance system (GKV-WSG) are then highlighted: the collision of the reform of private health insurance law with the reform of the entire insurance contract law as well as the length of the individual provisions and the correlating remark of member of parliament Merz in the Cicero magazine according to which no single member of parliament had even a rudimentary understanding of he was actually deciding on. From the point of view of substantive law, the main “diseases” of the GKV-WSG are strikingly shown, including in particular the creation and design of the basic rate as well as non-terminability etc. Finally reference is made to the double balancing act with which the private health insurance system is confronted: on the one hand the statutory health insurance system with its allocation principle and the private health insurance system with it superior principle of equivalence that wakens the desires of 4/5 of the German population who live in a poorly functioning system; on the other hand the field of tension between individual and collective consumer protection, i.e. between the high standards which are to be created for individuals which are then ultimately to be borne by the collective.     

How to improve scenario analysis as a strategic management tool?

Scenarios are claimed to support strategic decision makers. They are especially effective in dealing with uncertainties. This paper addresses some drawbacks of the conventional scenario method, which is especially directed at handling these uncertainties, and indicates possible avenues for methodological adaptations. We take the approach, which rests in the Shell tradition, as exemplary for our discussion on the mainstream scenario methodology. This approach has some limitations when it comes to dealing with simultaneous trends and countertrends, and trends or clusters of trends that are not thought of beforehand, especially the methodological requirements of causality and consistency, which might be limiting factors in this respect. This paper indicates alternative ways for scenario construction. It discusses the use of either recombinant scenarios, context scenarios, or inconsistent scenarios and/or combinations of these scenarios. These options explicitly incorporate the notion of ‘paradoxical trend’ as the codriver of future developments into the methodology.     

Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.