New Labour at work: long-term unemployment and the geography of opportunity

New Labour has placed great faith in active labour market policiesto address problems of long-term unemployment and poverty. Thispaper considers the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programmesin light of persistent regional employment disparities withinthe UK. It is argued that the government has proceeded froma flawed analysis of the causes and magnitude of long-term unemployment,framing the issue in terms of ‘worklessness’ andneglecting demand-side concerns of job availability and jobquality.     

PURE JOINT PRODUCTION,INCOME DISTRIBUTION,EMPLOYMENT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE

This paper deals with an open economy with heterogeneous capital and linear processes of pure joint production from a long‐period perspective. It is shown that: (1) an effective exchange rate change has ambiguous effects on the distribution of income and the competitiveness of domestic output; (2) the matrix of super‐multipliers linking exports to gross output is not always uniquely defined; and (3) the volume of exports and the volume of total employment may be inversely related, even if prices and distribution do not change.     

Solving the “Lachmann Problem”: Orientation,Individualism, and the Causal Explanation of Socioeconomic Order

This article examines the question of whether social institutions should be treated as possessing the sui generis causal power to influence people's actions. It does so by means of a case study of the work of the Austrian economist Ludwig Lachmann. Lachmann's account of how social institutions facilitate intentional human agency in the face of uncertainty contains significant ambiguities and tensions, stemming from his reluctance to acknowledge the causal efficacy of social institutions. The conceptual resources required to overcome these problems are to be found in realist social philosophy and social theory. The proposed resolution comes at a price, however, for it calls into question Lachmann's self‐avowed commitment to methodological individualism.     

Otra Empanada en la Parilla: Examining the Role of Culture and Information Sharing in Chile and Australia

One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share “bad news” (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross‐cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information‐sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision‐makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision‐makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision‐makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure

We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The regional impact of health care expenditure: the case of Italy

Decentralization invests the subcentral authorities of a country with autonomy in political and economic power the exercise of which may widen interregional divergence and inequality. This paper provides evidence demonstrating that in the case of Italy the central government's policies for rationalization and containment of the growth of health care expenditure in combination with decentralization in the administration and provision of health care have resulted in interregional inequality, aggravating the existing regional divergence.