Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.     

Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer Law

A reference to the need to create confident cross-border consumers who can contribute to the strengthening of the internal market has often been used as one of the main arguments for EC consumer policy and legislation. The argument has been presented in order to justify both the creation of a minimum safety net for consumers (the minimum confidence argument) and the current turn towards more total harmonisation of consumer protection (the harmonised confidence argument). In the paper these lines of argument are critically evaluated with reference to common sense knowledge about the behaviour of consumers as well as on the basis of Eurobarometer data concerning consumer confidence. In this light the substantive minimum harmonisation measures which have been justified with reference to the need for promoting consumer confidence seem only to a limited extent relevant with respect to the creation of such confidence. The current turn towards total harmonisation most certainly cannot be justified in this way. Other substantive measures, facilitating the access to a counterparty, would be more important in order to create consumer confidence in cross-border shopping, but the Community has almost systematically avoided adopting such measures.