Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

Ownership of Cross–Listed Equities: An Investigation of Turnover, Diversification, and Risk

Using data for a sample of Malaysian stocks that are traded in both Malaysia and Singapore, we show that the turnover rate (trading volume relative to shares held) is significantly higher in the foreign market than in the domestic market. We also find that ownership of cross–listed shares by foreign investors is not motivated by diversification benefits. Instead, we find that the proportion of a firm's shares held in Singapore is directly related to the firm's level of systematic risk.     

Testing Rival Theories of Budgetary Decision–making in the US States

This article tests three common budgetary decision–making theories in the US states. Pooled time series cross–section analysis is used from 1960 to 1996 to test the garbage can theory and incrementalism, and from 1989 to 1996 to test various theories of rational budgeting. The results demonstrate that there was some support for all three theories in terms of their impact on reducing state budget outputs. Rational budgeting reduces expenditures in aggregate, incrementalism has relatively low explanatory power below the aggregates, and garbage can budgeting is more prevalent in functional areas than for government as a whole. These findings imply that the future research agenda on budgetary decision–making theories should focus more on a system–wide approach, which takes into account many of the characteristics of all three rival models of decision–making, rather than exclusively focusing on each one singly.     

Density estimation in the uniform deconvolution model

We consider the problem of estimating a probability density function based on data that are corrupted by noise from a uniform distribution. The (nonparametric) maximum likelihood estimator for the corresponding distribution function is well defined. For the density function this is not the case. We study two nonparametric estimators for this density. The first is a type of kernel density estimate based on the empirical distribution function of the observable data. The second is a kernel density estimate based on the MLE of the distribution function of the unobservable (uncorrupted) data.     

Getting the Most Out of a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Requirement

Recent advances in asset pricing—the reduced-form approach to pricing risky debt and derivatives—are used to quantitatively evaluate several proposals for mandatory bank issue of subordinated debt. We find that credit spreads on both fixed- and floating-rate subordinated debt provide relatively clean signals of bank risk and are not unduly influenced by nonrisk factors. Fixed-rate debt with a put is unacceptable, but making the putable debt floating resolves most problems. Our approach also helps to clarify several different notions of “bank risk.”     

An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.