Derived factor demand under monopoly

Summary. We generalize the formula provided by Maurice and Ferguson (1973) for derived factor demand in a monopoly by extending it to cross-price effects and taking into account other variables which may, within an general-equilibrium framework, affect demand, such as income. Hopefully, both features increase the applicability of this formula in general-equilibrium analyses. Received: April 5, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001     

At the mercy of a prisoner three dictator experiments

We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.     

A positive analysis of labor-market institutions and tax reforms

In this paper, we investigate the structure of the “Laffer curve” for taxes on labor and other factors of production, under different institutional frameworks of the labor market. Using a Cobb–Douglas production technology allows us to characterize important properties of the “Laffer curve” in terms of the wage share for a competitive labor market, the monopoly union model, the right-to-manage approach, the insider-dominated union, and efficient Nash bargains simultaneously. In this way, we are able to highlight the menu of factor tax systems, and thus of potential tax reforms available to a government, without perfect knowledge of the mechanism of the labor market. In particular, we show that the employment-maximizing tax system features a constant energy tax, while the energy mini-/maximizing tax system features a constant labor tax. We also illuminate to what extent these results must be modified if we either employ a CES production function, or if we allow for an endogenous reservation wage.     

New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions

This article introduces a large new cross-country database,the Database of Political Institutions. It covers 177 countriesover 21 years, 1975–95. The article presents the intuition,construction, and definitions of the different variables. Amongthe novel variables introduced are several measures of checksand balances, tenure and stability, identification of partyaffiliation with government or opposition, and fragmentationof opposition and government parties in the legislature.