Ins, outs, and the duration of trade

Abstract.  We employ survival analysis to study the duration of U.S. imports. Our findings indicate international trade is far more dynamic than previously thought. The median duration of exporting a product to the U.S. is very short, on the order of two to four years. There is negative duration dependence. If a country is able to survive in the exporting market for the first few years it will face a very small probability of failure and will likely export the product for a long period of time. The results hold across countries and industries and are robust to aggregation. JEL classification: F14, F19, C14, C41     

How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment

The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.      

Notes on the producer society

Summary The author criticizes economists for their uncritical acceptance of consumers’ revealed preference and tries to explain the preferences manifest in the United States by tracing them to cultural influences, especially the Puritan Ethic, and to economic factors, such as producers’ domination and economies of scale. Differences between American and European behavior patterns are sought mainly in comparative time budgets and Hawtrey’s distinction between defensive and creative consumption is revived as a framework suitable for such analysis. These notes constitute an early version of what has since become a much more ambitious work with a more analytical approach, trying to use behavioral psychology to fill in gaps in the economist’s understanding of consumer behavior, and to be published as a book.     

WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME

Abstract.  We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.