Expenditure elasticities of the demand for leisure services

Although some research has already focused on the analysis of expenditure elasticities of leisure demand, some shortcomings with regard to the content and the underlying theoretical model as well as the applied methods exist. This article aims at avoiding these problems to provide consistent derivatives of leisure service expenditure elasticities. Therefore, a regular demand system is derived from microeconomic duality theory. To implement leisure specific demand factors (i.e. demand- and supply-based sports and recreational opportunities as well as sports and recreational preferences) while still being consistent with neoclassical demand theory, the basic model is extended by applying the demographic translation framework. Data of the continuous household budget survey (n?=?7724) from Germany is used for the estimation of the derived demand system. It is shown how sensitive the results are depending on the applied (censored) regression model: 16 out of 18 analysed services are indicated as luxury goods based on the findings of the Tobit model type I but as necessities based on the findings of the Tobit model type II. Possible implications are presented and discussed.     

Demand uncertainty and foreign trade in the UK tobacco industry

The concern about the potential health harzards of various tobacco products in the UK has led many tobacco companies to exploit markets in underdeveloped countries. These markets are relatively safe since the health risks of tobacco are not yet fully known. The possibility, therefore, arises that domestic producers might exploit certain markets to provide a form of profit insurance, exporting surpluses when domestic demand is unexpectedly low. This study concentrates on the UK cigarette industry. However, similar analysis could be performed for any uncertain market where a certain alternative exists that can be exploited at relatively low cost.     

Compositional data analysis and zeros in micro data

The application of compositional data analysis methods in economics has some attraction. The methodology relies upon the use of 'log-ratios' in the statistical analysis. Such an approach is not possible when the data to be analysed include observations where the observed budget share is zero. We, therefore, consider and extend the methods of compositional data analysis in the situation where the data to be analysed include observations where the observed budget share is zero. The modified compositional data methods are discussed both in statistical terms and through potential economic interpretations of the method. Further, the modified methodology is applied to the 1988-89 Australian Household Expenditure Survey yielding estimates for a system of Engel curves.     

Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games

Equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient, as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a “best possible” outcome. We study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973) 65], and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the players—games in which optimization by individuals approximately optimizes the social good, in spite of the lack of coordination between players. Our results extend previous work on traffic routing games.     

Market Liberalization,Regulatory Uncertainty,and Firm Investment

This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.     

Prenatal care: Mechanisms and impacts on infant health and health care utilization

We estimate that prenatal care has positive impacts on health measured at birth, shifts the distribution of future health care utilization away from inpatient care, and find that some of these impacts likely come from an informational mechanism. We also find well child visits are used in a complementary fashion with emergency department care in the production of infant health, suggesting that factors beyond barriers to access may drive the demand for emergency care. Finally, we find differential impacts of prenatal care across racial groups with evidence that the information mechanism may be particularly important for black mothers.     

One-sided bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

I consider a bargaining game in which only one player can make proposals and the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is like a situation where: (i) a CEO suggests a possible hire, who must be okayed by a board of directors, or (ii) the US president nominates a potential judge, who must be okayed by the Senate. My main result is an algorithm that finds the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. The number of steps in the algorithm is on the order of $n$, the number of possibilities (e.g., applicants to a job) that the bargainers may consider. By contrast, if one uses backwards induction to solve the game, then the number of steps is on the order of $n!$. A corollary of the main result, similar to some results of previous bargaining models, is that the wait costs of only one player, the non-proposer, is relevant to the outcome. The wait costs of the proposer are irrelevant, provided that they are positive. Applied to the nomination process specified by the US Constitution, the corollary suggests that only the Senate's wait costs are relevant to the outcome—the president's wait costs are irrelevant. As I argue, this result may explain a little-noticed regularity of American politics. This is that the Senate seems to have much influence in the selection of lower-court judges but relatively little influence in the selection of Supreme Court justices.     

Missing Markets and Redundant Reservoirs

This paper uses a two-sector, two-period,spatial model of groundwater usage withstochastic surface water supply to illustratethe potential for the suboptimal management ofthe timing of groundwater uses. A ``timeprofile externality' is said to exist when thetiming of groundwater extraction by one set ofusers impacts on the time profile of wateravailability to another set of users. Theexistence of the time of use externalitydepends on the presence of importantdifferences in the preferences between thecontrol and non-control sectors. It alsodepends on the absence of the markets thatwould internalise these differences. Oneimportant implication of the existence of suchexternalities is that they can inducesub-optimal insurance investments in the formof water storage capital, i.e., unnecessarysurface water reservoirs.