THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

A Primer on the Economics of Shale Gas Production Just How Cheap is Shale Gas?

The authors analyze the economics of natural gas production in the U.S. in light of the government's recent dramatic upward revisions in gas reserve estimates as a result of advances in horizontal drilling and fracturing (“fracking”). While some observers believe the U.S. will enjoy very large supplies of low‐priced gas for a long time to come, others are not so sure. Using the data from gas wells completed in the Haynesville shale of northern Louisiana, the authors offer a probabilistic and economic perspective on these newly accessible reserves. Their model and NPV simulations indicate that shale gas exploitation is probably sustainable (with a 60% likelihood), but with some important reservations. NPVs are highly sensitive to gas price assumptions and projected production volumes. The authors' base case assumes the continuation into the foreseeable future of the current gas futures price curve; but the authors also point out that a fall in price of just 17% along that curve would reduce well NPVs to zero. Although it is clear that production from shale wells declines more rapidly than production from conventional wells, engineers have too little history with shale wells to forecast ultimate production with great confidence. Nevertheless, shale gas drilling opportunities also present energy companies with valuable “follow‐on” real options that are not captured in NPV analysis. This additional source of value is inherent in vast shale gas formations in which successful wells tend to lead to more development opportunities.     

Leverage and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers

This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash flows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverage-increasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders.     

The Going-Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets

This paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency, the choice between private and public financing, and the development of capital markets in emerging economies. Generally, the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire, and if investors receive valuable information without cost. The value of public firms generally depends on public market size, which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public, so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public. The model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development.     

Accounting for Sovereign Risk When Investing in Emerging Markets

In theory, political risk is project‐specific and should be accounted for in the estimation of the expected investment cash flows. But in practice, the political risk associated with this type of investment is typically accounted for implicitly by adjusting the investment's required rate of return or the discount rate. As the authors discuss in the article, this approach disguises the specific assumptions being made about the risk of expropriation and so makes it difficult to assess this risk properly. While defending some aspects of current practice, the authors argue that corporate executives should consider some changes. For example, although a project analysis that is shared with the host government could incorporate a risk adjustment to the discount rate, the authors suggest that more explicit analysis of the anticipated risk of expropriation should be incorporated into the analysis of expected project cash flows. This analysis could involve making specific assumptions about the “term structure” of expropriation risk over the life of the investment. Finally, the authors note that the political risk of making investments in emerging economies can be managed to some extent. Investments can be structured in ways that reduce political risk by structuring project cash flows in ways that better align the incentives of the project sponsor and the government of the host country.     

Do Real Estate Prices and Stock Prices Move Together? An International Analysis

The relationship between stock prices and real estate prices has been the subject of substantial debate in both the academic and practitioner literatures. Existing studies have focused on the time series of stock and real estate returns using data from a single country, such as the U.S. By necessity, these studies examine return and price changes over short intervals, creating a bias when property values are smoothed from year to year. Using data from 17 different countries over 14 years, this paper examines the relation between stock returns and changes in property values and rents. Consistent with other country-specific studies, we find that, with the exception of Japan, the contemporaneous relation between yearly real estate price changes and stock returns is not statistically significant. However, when the data are pooled across countries and when we look at longer measurement intervals, a significant relation between stock returns and both rents and value changes becomes apparent. Real estate prices are also found to be significantly influenced by GDP growth rates and provide a good long-term hedge against inflation but a poor year-to-year hedge.     

Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation

US corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets. This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the magnitude of US multinational cash holdings are, in part, a consequence of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. In addition, less financially constrained firms and those that are more technology intensive exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.     

An Entrepreneur's Guide to Understanding the Cost of Venture Capital

Entrepreneurs who deal with a venture capital firm (VC) for the first time often find themselves unprepared for the experience. The deal structure language used to describe financing terms, and the methods used to value the investment, are unique to the VC world. The authors have two objectives in preparing this entrepreneur's guide to venture capital finance: First, they explain why VCs require rates of return that are considerably higher—even after adjusting for difference in risk—than the returns required by the shareholders of established companies. Their explanation focuses on differences of opinion between overly optimistic entrepreneurs and less sanguine VCs. Second, the authors discuss the difficulty faced by entrepreneurs when trying to understand the actual cost of VC financing (including the dilution of value that occurs when entrepreneurs fail to meet targets or milestones). The problem can be traced to deal structure terms that typically call for the VC to receive preferential treatment in the event the entrepreneur's scenario does not turn out to be accurate. More specifically, entrepreneurs often grant VCs control rights as well as liquidation rights that, when things go wrong, dramatically increase the effective cost to entrepreneurs of venture financing.     

The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision

A firm's liquidation can impose costs on its customers, workers, and suppliers. An agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm (as the agent) affects other individuals (the customers, workers, and suppliers as principals). The analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive/conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre-positioning or bonding mechanism. Appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex-ante value-maximizing liquidation policy.