Japan's Fiscal Policies in the 1990s

This paper first summarises Japan's fiscal policies in the 1990s. Then, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of government debt and the sustainability problem. We find that the Keynesian fiscal policy in the 1990s was not effective and fiscal sustainability may therefore become a serious issue. We also estimate the optimal level of deficits and evaluate fiscal reconstruction movements. It is shown that the actual deficit exceeded the optimal level in the late 1990s. We then inspect fiscal reconstruction movements in the Hashimoto Administration in 1997 and find that the major factor of recession in 1997 was not fiscal consolidation. An important lesson from Japan's fiscal policies in the 1990s is that long‐run structural reform is more important than short‐run Keynesian policy.     

Networked FDI: Sales and Sourcing Patterns of Japanese Foreign Affiliates

This paper applies a novel empirical approach to characterising the horizontal‐ness and vertical‐ness of affiliates based on Yeaple's complex FDI concept. In its simplest form, horizontal‐ness is measured as affiliates’ local sales share while their vertical‐ness is measures as their share of non‐local sourcing of intermediates. Japanese affiliates in most sectors and nations are partly vertical and partly horizontal, but those in North American are far more ‘horizontal’ than those in the EU and Asia. Affiliates became more vertical between 1996 and 2005. A four‐way sales and sourcing split (host, home, regional and RoW) suggests that affiliates act as nodes in regional production networks – especially in Asia. We posit several hypotheses that could be tested with our empirical approach.     

Inefficient but Robust Public Leadership

We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly in a differentiated product market. We find that private leadership is better than public leadership from a social welfare perspective if the private firm is domestic, regardless of the degree of product differentiation. Nevertheless, the public leadership equilibrium is risk-dominant, and it is thus robust if the degree of product differentiation is high. We also find that regardless of the degree of product differentiation, the public leadership equilibrium is risk-dominant if the private firm is foreign. These results may explain the recent revival of public financial institutions in Japan.     

Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach

This study formulates a dynamic mixed oligopoly model, in which a state‐owned public firm competes against a private firm over multiple periods. We adopt a differential game formulated by Fershtman and Kamien [Econometrica 55 (1987), pp. 1151–1164] and investigate how the dynamic competition affects the optimal privatization policy. We characterize the open‐loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov‐perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). We show that in the MPNE, an increase in the degree of privatization has a nonmonotonic effect on the price, increasing it in a wide range of parameter spaces, which is in sharp contrast to the result in the OLNE or static analyses. We also find that the optimal degree of privatization is higher in the MPNE than that in the OLNE and static equilibrium. These results suggest that intertemporal strategic behavior changes the optimal privatization policy.     

HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*

This article investigates the relationship between the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare in multiple‐leader Stackelberg models. We formulate two long‐run models of free entry of followers; in the first (second) model, leaders select their output before (after) the entry of the followers. We find that in both models, in contrast to the short‐run models, the Stackelberg model yields a larger welfare and HHI than the Cournot model does regardless of the number of leaders; that is, beneficial concentration always occurs.     

Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem

This paper elaborates on Salop (1979) who showed that the number of firms at free-entry equilibrium is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare (excess-entry theorem). This paper considers an integer problem of the number of firms entering the market. We find that the excess-entry theorem does not hold true if the marginal production cost is increasing, while it holds true if the marginal production cost is constant. This result warns against the use of the excess-entry theorem for rationalizing entry regulation such as the notorious Japanese Large-Scaled Retail Act restricting the new entry of retailers.     

International spillover effects of consumption taxation

This paper investigates the international spillover effects of a revenue-neutral increase in consumption taxes coupled with a reduction in wage taxes in a two-country open economy. Many economists feel that the consumption tax would be an improvement over the income tax. This paper provides counterexamples to the conventional wisdom. We show that conversion to a consumption tax may reduce capital accumulation and may transmit a negative externality to the rest of the countries in the world economy under certain conditions: endogenous labor supply and bequests.     

Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan

This paper investigates the politicoeconomic properties of the fiscal reconstruction process in Japan by analyzing the dynamic game among local interest groups with concessions of region-specific privileges. Free-riding behavior of local interest groups brings numerous deficits. Our empirical evidence indicates that local privileges were powerful in the 1990s, which is the main reason fiscal reconstruction did not perform very well in the 1990s. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 492–511. Faculty of Economics, Keio University, and Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego; and Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan, and Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office of Japan, 3-1-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8970, Japan. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, F13, D62.     

Mixed Duopoly with Product Differentiation: Sequential Choice of Location

We investigate the sequential choice of location in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare–maximising public firm competes against a profit–maximising private firm. We examine the desirable role of the public firm in a mixed market. We also consider the effect of price regulation. We find that the public firm should become the follower (leader) if a price regulation is (is not) imposed. We also find that neither price regulation nor privatisation of the public firm improves welfare.