环境公益诉讼与行政诉讼的原告适格——欧盟各国的发展情况

环境公益诉讼,尤其是行政诉讼中,原告适格问题是制度建设的重要事项。欧盟各国以《奥胡斯公约》及欧盟指令为轴心,通过各自的公益行政诉讼制度建设,如民众诉讼制度、制定特别法承认团体的原告适格,或通过扩大传统的利益概念,扩大法保护的对象等不同方式达到扩大原告适格的目的,实现公约所保障的司法参与权,使得司法保障成为环境政策中不可欠缺的制度性手段。     

Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports

We investigate competition between a domestic intellectual property right holder and a foreign imitator and consider how parallel imports affect their profits. We consider a two-country model. Country A is a developed country where intellectual property rights are highly protected, and country B is a developing country where protection is weak. The intellectual property right holder can sell the products for both markets while the imitator cannot export the products to country A. We find that permitting parallel imports can be beneficial for both players because it serves as a commitment device to soften price competition.     

Economic Integration of Countries with International Public Goods

This paper develops a model of economic integration that is subject to random emergency costs. To mitigate the effects of these disruptions, each country that belongs to a club provides an international public good. This paper incorporates voluntary provision of public goods into a rigorous general equilibrium model of economic integration under uncertainty. It is shown that an increase in the probability of war or the penalty ratio in a club may raise the welfare and the size of the club if risk aversion with respect to private consumption is not so large. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1994, 8(4), pp. 530–550. Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Tokyo 113, Japan; and Department of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560, Japan.     

COMPETITIVENESS AND STABILITY OF COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR

We investigate the relationship between the degree of competition and the stability of collusive behaviour, by introducing the element of relative performance in the objective functions of the firms. We show that an increase in the degree of competition destabilizes the collusion. This relation differs starkly in the standard symmetric Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models, with the former being more unstable than the latter.     

Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem

This paper elaborates on Salop (1979) who showed that the number of firms at free-entry equilibrium is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare (excess-entry theorem). This paper considers an integer problem of the number of firms entering the market. We find that the excess-entry theorem does not hold true if the marginal production cost is increasing, while it holds true if the marginal production cost is constant. This result warns against the use of the excess-entry theorem for rationalizing entry regulation such as the notorious Japanese Large-Scaled Retail Act restricting the new entry of retailers.