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81.
This paper compares two policies: trade cost reduction and firm relocation cost reduction using a three-country version of a heterogeneous-firms geography and trade model, where the three countries have different market (population) sizes. We show how the effects of the two policies differ, in particular for the country of intermediate size. Unless the intermediate country is very small, in a relative sense, it will gain industry when relocation costs are reduced, but lose industry when trade costs are reduced. The smallest country loses industry in both cases, but only experiences lower welfare in the case of lower relocation costs. Thus, the ranking of the policies from the point of view of the two small and intermediate countries tends to be the opposite. 相似文献
82.
Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity. 相似文献
83.
The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms. 相似文献
84.
Toshihiro Ihori 《Journal of public economics》1983,20(3):387-389
Pazner and Sadka (1981) offer simple sufficient conditions for accepting or rejecting tax reforms based on the theory of index numbers. We provide not only sufficient conditions but also necessary conditions for the validity of tax reforms. Thus, a complete characterization of tax reforms is obtained. 相似文献
85.
Toshihiro Ihori 《Economics Letters》1981,8(1):89-93
This paper shows that even at the second best solution the golden rule and the Ramsey rule hold if all the effective non-lump sum taxes are available in the context of an overlapping generations model. 相似文献
86.
Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model. In contrast to Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156.], the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint. 相似文献
87.
Mixed oligopoly, foreign firms, and location choice 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:4
We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms which are all profit-maximizing. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign private firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among the foreign firms. Regardless of n and m, agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We provide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social welfare. We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public firms, inefficiency of the public firm, and entries by private firms. We obtain some additional implications of welfare and equilibrium locations. 相似文献
88.
Toshihiro Matsumura Noriaki Matsushima Giorgos Stamatopoulos 《Journal of Economics》2010,99(3):267-276
It is known that if exogenous cost heterogeneities between the firms in a spatial duopoly model are large, then the model
does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in location choices. It is also known that when these heterogeneities are stochastically
determined after firms choose their locations, spatial agglomeration can appear. To tackle these issues, the current paper
modifies the spatial framework by allowing firms to exchange the cost-efficient production technology via royalties. It is
shown that technology transfer guarantees the existence of a location equilibrium in pure strategies and that maximum differentiation
appears in the market. 相似文献
89.
We investigate a desirable role of public enterprise in mixed oligopoly in free-entry markets. We compare the following three
cases: (a) a public firm produces before private firms (public leadership), (b) all firms produce simultaneously (Cournot),
(c) a public firm produces after private firms (private leadership). We find that private leadership is best and public leadership
is worst, in contrast to the cases without entries and exits of private firms. We also investigate the welfare implication
of privatization. We find that some important results shown by existing works do not hold under private leadership. 相似文献
90.
The international trade literature confirms that the average productivity of exporters is higher than that of nonexporters, while economic geography studies establish that urban firms tend to be more productive than rural ones. By introducing region‐specific transportation costs in a Melitz‐type heterogeneous‐firm trade model, the theory predicts that the minimum threshold productivity level for export is higher but that for survival by serving the local market is lower in the periphery region than in the core. Using Japanese plant‐level panel data, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that exporters in the peripheral regions, especially those distant from the core, have large productivity premiums. 相似文献