Cell Production and Workplace Innovation in Japan: Toward a New Model for Japanese Manufacturing?

This article investigates the current trend toward cell production and other workplace innovations in Japan using a large–scale sampling survey of manufacturing firms and in–depth interviews with four leading electrical and electronic establishments. The quantitative analysis reveals the correlation between the use of cell production and the ratio of female to male workers and production strategy variables, as well as the positive effect of cell production on operating profit rates and ordinary profit rates. The case studies reveal the following points: First, processes and organizations have been decentralized to the degree that individual workshops move toward taking primary responsibility for customer relations, production decisions, and delivery. Corporate headquarters increasingly play a coordinating rather than decision–making role. Second, firms have steadily implemented make–to–order systems by tightening links to suppliers and customers and developing new inventory and cost–control systems. Third, firms have started to implement more performance–based personnel practices. However, considerable variance among firms is observed in complementary changes, particularly personnel innovations.     

Estimating noncooperative and cooperative models of bargaining: an empirical comparison

This paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from a noncooperative formulation of government formulation à la (Baron and Ferejohn in Am Poli Sci Rev 87:34–47, 1989) with those from two alternative cooperative formulations (Nash in Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950; Shapley and Shubik in Am Poli Sci Rev 48:787–792, 1954). Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that the noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the noncooperative structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.     

Cost-effectiveness of intravitreal aflibercept versus other treatments for wet age-related macular degeneration in Japan

Objective: This analysis estimated the cost-effectiveness of intravitreal aflibercept injection(s) (IAI) for wet age-related macular degeneration (wAMD) compared with other treatments in Japan.

Methods: This was a cost-utility analysis based on published data. A state-transition cohort model was constructed with six health states based on best-corrected visual acuity in the better-seeing eye. The cycle time was 4 weeks, and the time horizon was 12 years. The model compared IAI 2?mg every 8 weeks (2q8) for 2 years after three initial monthly injections, ranibizumab as needed, ranibizumab 0.5?mg every 4 weeks (0.5q4), pegaptanib sodium 0.3?mg every 6 weeks, verteporfin photodynamic therapy (PDT), and best supportive care, assumed to include medical management and monitoring, but no active therapy. Costs (expressed as Japanese yen [JPY]) and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained were estimated for each treatment and discounted at 2.0%. Input data were obtained from clinical studies, the Japanese drug tariff and social insurance reimbursement schedule, and expert opinion. The analysis was conducted from the societal perspective, including medical costs as well as costs of blindness.

Results: IAI 2q8 was dominant (i.e. more effective in terms of QALYs and less costly) to all other comparators (ranibizumab as needed, ranibizumab 0.5q4, pegaptanib sodium, PDT, and best supportive care), as shown by the incremental cost-utility ratio (i.e. cost per QALY gained).

Limitations: The strengths of the analysis include the wide range of comparators evaluated and the use of Japanese-specific utility data. The limitations include the use of one eye, inclusion of published data up to 2 years only, and assumptions on disease course over 5 years.

Conclusions: IAI 2q8 was more effective in terms of QALYs and less costly compared with other treatments for wAMD in Japan.     

Population growth and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model

This study investigates whether the transfer paradox (donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment) occurs when a donor and a recipient have different population growth rates by using a one‐sector, two‐country overlapping generations model. We show that if the population growth rates differ, neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state under dynamic efficiency. This result is in stark contrast to the existing results that the transfer paradox might occur when a donor and a recipient country have different marginal propensities to save, assuming that both have the same population growth rate. Furthermore, we present the condition for the transfer problem to occur on the transition path and show that the transfer paradox is less likely to occur as the economy converges to the steady state. Our result shows that the prevailing finding that the transfer paradox can occur in an overlapping generations model is limited to the special case of countries having the same population growth rate.     

On Market Integration and Product R&D: A Monopoly Case

Applying a monopoly model with endogenous quality choice to the case of multiple national markets, we consider the effect of market integration on product R&D incentives (i.e., quality-improving), profit, and consumer surplus. We demonstrate that the effect of market integration depends on the difference in income distributions between two countries and the level of trade cost. In particular, if the difference in income distributions between two countries is large (small) and/or trade cost is low (high), market integration can decrease (increase) the level of product quality and social welfare in the two countries.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Dynamic Interactions in Trade Policy in a Differential Game Model of Tariff Protection

This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.     

A framework for estimating willingness-to-pay to avoid endogenous environmental risks

This paper proposes a general empirical strategy to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for exogenous risk mitigation when environmental risks are endogenous in protective actions and consumers are imperfectly informed about the ambient risk levels. The strategy consists of a set of survey techniques and the dummy endogenous variable model (Heckman, 1978) to control for correlation in unobserved errors that enter the WTP equation and the protection-decision equation. The method is applied to the non-market valuation survey data on arsenic contamination in drinking water. Our results indicate that the estimated WTPs are significantly higher for households without self-protective action. Our approach thus offers not only the correct welfare estimate for exogenous reduction of environmental risks, but also yields policy implications qualitatively much different from the conventional approach. We also estimate the welfare value of the policy to inform and educate the public about the arsenic risk simultaneously with public risk mitigation. The estimated welfare value is similar to, though slightly higher than, that of risk mitigation without information component. This occurs due to the competing effects of information dissemination and risk mitigation efforts.     

On the effects of emission standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly: A note

Employing a model of an environmentally differentiated product market, we analyze how an emission regulation as non-tariff barriers to trade affects imports, the environment, and welfare in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly. Related to this issue, we reconsider the result of Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero [Moraga-González, J.L., Padrón-Fumero, N., 2002. Environmental policy in a green market. Environmental and Resource Economics 22, 419–447] that a strict emission standard on a dirtier product degrades the environment and reduces the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger. On the other hand, we show that a strict emission standard on a cleaner product always improves the environment and the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage.     

Strategic Trade Policy and Network Compatibility

We consider strategic trade policy for information and communication technology (ICT) product markets with international rivalry. Usually, ICT products exhibit network externalities and product compatibility (i.e., network compatibility). We demonstrate that the optimal strategic trade policy depends on the degree of network compatibility of ICT products. Furthermore, using an endogenous decision game for strategic variables (i.e., quantity and price), we consider the relationship between the optimal strategic trade policies and the endogenous mode of competition.