AN EVALUATION OF PROCESS‐ORIENTED SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS

Supply chain management (SCM) is implemented by integrating corporate functions using business processes within and across companies. Several process‐oriented frameworks for SCM have been proposed but only two of these provide sufficient detail to enable implementation. We evaluate the Supply‐Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) framework and The Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF) framework using four criteria and identify their relative strengths and weaknesses.     

Feature selection methods involving support vector machines for prediction of insolvency in non‐life insurance companies

We propose two novel approaches for feature selection and ranking tasks based on simulated annealing (SA) and Walsh analysis, which use a support vector machine as an underlying classifier. These approaches are inspired by one of the key problems in the insurance sector: predicting the insolvency of a non‐life insurance company. This prediction is based on accounting ratios, which measure the health of the companies. The approaches proposed provide a set of ratios (the SA approach) and a ranking of the ratios (the Walsh analysis ranking) that would allow a decision about the financial state of each company studied. The proposed feature selection methods are applied to the prediction the insolvency of several Spanish non‐life insurance companies, yielding state‐of‐the‐art results in the tests performed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Statistical Decision Problems and Bayesian Nonparametric Methods

This paper considers parametric statistical decision problems conducted within a Bayesian nonparametric context. Our work was motivated by the realisation that typical parametric model selection procedures are essentially incoherent. We argue that one solution to this problem is to use a flexible enough model in the first place, a model that will not be checked no matter what data arrive. Ideally, one would use a nonparametric model to describe all the uncertainty about the density function generating the data. However, parametric models are the preferred choice for many statisticians, despite the incoherence involved in model checking, incoherence that is quite often ignored for pragmatic reasons. In this paper we show how coherent parametric inference can be carried out via decision theory and Bayesian nonparametrics. None of the ingredients discussed here are new, but our main point only becomes evident when one sees all priors—even parametric ones—as measures on sets of densities as opposed to measures on finite-dimensional parameter spaces.     

Assessment of Interjudge Reliability in the Open-Ended Questions Coding Process

In the process of coding open-ended questions, the evaluation of interjudge reliability is a critical issue. In this paper, using real data, the behavior of three coefficients of reliability among coders, Cohen’s K, Krippendorff’s α and Perreault and Leigh’s I _r are patterned, in terms of the number of judges involved and the categories of answer defined. The outcome underlines the importance of both variables in the valuations of interjudge reliability, as well as the higher adequacy of Perreault and Leigh’s I _r and Krippendorff’s α for marketing and opinion research.     

Pseudo empirical likelihood method in the presence of missing data

In this paper, we propose an estimator for the population mean when some observations on the study and auxiliary variables are missing from the sample. The proposed estimator is valid for any unequal probability sampling design, and is based upon the pseudo empirical likelihood method. The proposed estimator is compared with other estimators in a simulation study.     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.