Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Predicting the budgetary funding need of education in the three-year budget for 2008–2010

The paper presents a technique developed by the authors, which makes it possible to determine the necessary amount of financing for education at all the budget system levels for 2008-2010, based on the Russian average value of financing, taking into account the budget expenditures index for two variants of student population, i.e. the actual number of on-budget students and the number of students required to meet the economy’s need for trained workers. The technique was developed and the calculations were made on the basis of Russian long-term forecasts and the Russian three-year federal budget for 2008–2010.     

Trends in economic cooperation between Southern Russian regions

The economic situation, foreign economic relations, and export/import structure of Southern Russian regions are considered; the author’s opinion on the development of free economic prices in Southern Russiaís resort area is given; this conclusion is justified on the grounds that any trends emerging in the foreign relations of Southern Russian regions must be adjusted to match the targets set for the country as a whole.     

Sunspot fluctuations in dynamics with predetermined variables

Summary. In this paper, I study the existence of Sunspot Equilibria in a general framework whose dynamics allow for the presence of predetermined variables in the system. The main motivation for this research comes from the fact that previous studies did not allow for such predetermined variables which, nevertheless, appear quite naturally in economic models. I show, for a non-negligible subset of dynamics with predetermined variables verifying usual assumptions, the existence of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria fluctuating between an arbitrary finite number of states arbitrarily close to a steady state. Received: March 1, 1995; revised version September 18, 1996     

The different faces of coupon elasticity

Coupons account for over two-thirds of all consumer promotional efforts initiated by the manufacturers of consumer goods. In this study, the impact of coupons on brand sales is investigated and how that impact decays over the life of the coupon is demonstrated. Specifically, we present an econometric model that can capture coupon effects in terms of equivalent price reduction, account for coupon effects over time, allow inference of coupon effects when retailers decide to double or triple the coupon value, and provide both self-coupon and cross-coupon elasticities at different levels of aggregation. A widely used sales response model is adapted, and an analytical model is proposed to estimate both the self-coupon and cross-coupon (face value) elasticities of sales at the store level. From the store-level elasticity estimates for a given week, the authors analytically derive the coupon elasticities for the chain level by aggregating across stores, and over the life of the coupon by aggregating over time. The proposed sales response model is estimated with the data obtained from three markets for various product categories, and the coupon elasticities are computed. The proposed framework allows one to demonstrate the hypothetical equivalence of a shelf-price reduction for a given coupon face value in each week. Also, the effect of doubling the face value of a coupon results in more than a proportionate increase in elasticity. The authors find that both self and cross-coupon elasticities are much smaller in magnitude than the average self and cross-price elasticity measures reported in the literature.     

The Competitive Characteristics of U.S Manufacturers in the Machine Tool Industry

This paper examines the competitive characteristics of U.S. manufacturers in the machine tool (MT) industry. After several decades of decline, this industry has recently shown signs of a modest but sustained recovery. Empirical evidence from a national survey of 104 MT producers suggests that the revival of this sector has been driven by a combination of factors, including renewed export involvement, improved customer support, and better product design. Although most MT companies are small-to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the survey data show that very small SMEs are poorly represented in the recovery thrust of the industry as a whole. Our principal conclusion is that the MT industry has been following an export-led path toward stabilization, but that certain types of small producers are unlikely to thrive for very long. The most serious problems facing small producers include shrinking local markets, import competition, shortages of skilled labor, and cyclical demand.