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71.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
72.
This article was prepared by Dr L. V. Defris and J. S. McDonnell of the Institute research staff. The authors wish to thank Professor R. F. Henderson and Dr P. J. Sheehan for their helpful comments. 相似文献
73.
74.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
75.
János Gács 《Empirica》1994,21(1):83-104
The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget. 相似文献
76.
Policymakers in the legislative and regulatory arenas face increasing public expectations that authorities will both promulgate and implement strict environmental programs. At the same time, the aggregate cost of such programs is rising and is impacting economic sectors previously untouched. In this context, a major study used an integrated interdisciplinary perspective to determine what economic benefits would result from air pollution controls. Specifically, the study developed estimates for the health benefits of reducing ozone and fine particulate matter concentrations in the nation's most polluted region—the South Coast Air Basin centering on Los Angeles. This paper presents the economic methodologies and results of that study. It also discusses how health and atmospheric sciences informed the economic assessment. 相似文献
77.
In this paper, estimates of the elasticities that characterize the structure of demand for farmed salmon in Spain and Italy are reported. The demand models are specified using a Box-Cox transformation of the variables and a Hausman test is used to determine price endogeneity in the demand equations. The results show short-run unitary own-price elasticity of demand for farmed salmon in both markets, but long run estimates show significant elastic price response. Short run substitution of salmon for other fish species is not observed and, for both Spain and Italy, farmed salmon is characterized as a luxury good. Interestingly, we show that our a priori expectations about own-price elasticities being lower in smaller market areas is confirmed. Finally, the results obtained are compared to other recent results reported in the salmon demand literature. 相似文献
78.
A bstract . The moral basis for the recommendation of Henry George that land , not labor and capital, be taxed is explained. The justification is that the value of land is socially created by density of population and as a result of private and public improvements , such as roads and utilities. This policy is advocated on the basis of its very successful, if limited, use in many places. It is contended that the need for many forms of social intervention in the economic process, which have many side consequences, would be dramatically lessened. 相似文献
79.
80.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献