The continuing validity of the strategy‐structure nexus: new findings, 1993–2003

This study analyzes whether a diversification strategy facilitates subsequent divisionalization (and hence that ‘structure follows strategy’), and/or whether the multidivisional structure leads to a diversification strategy (and hence that ‘strategy follows structure’). In theoretical terms, this study is original in that it institutes a debate between the Chandler thesis and other perspectives that challenge the generalizability of the strategy‐structure nexus. Interestingly, this new study with contemporaneous data for the period 1993–2003 sheds light on this contested issue and postulates that despite the criticism of Chandler's contribution, it still works. Our results show that strategic diversification affects structural divisionalization, and in turn, structural divisionalization affects strategic diversification. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D Project Selection Strategy: an empirical study in Spain

The author has investigated the role played by project selection methods in defining a firm's technology strategy, as exemplified by a sample of innovative companies in Spain. The information was collected by a combination of questionnaire and interview with key personnel.
The author was able to classify strategies into four groups: (1) a planning strategy, essentially a negotiation comprising top-down and bottom-up elements; (2) an economic strategy in which a large number of economic criteria set in advance by top management are used to evaluate projects; (3) a market strategy in which R&D is seen more or less as an adjunct to the Marketing function, which defines the products needed and negotiates the programme with top management; (4) a technical strategy, used in circumstances in which technological innovation is essential and in which, therefore, economic factors take a subsidiary place.
The author's data show that in companies operating a planning strategy project selection methods of various, perhaps ad hoc kinds play a key role in reaching a company consensus. For those using an economic strategy the selection criteria are predetermined and selection methods inflexible. In the case of the market strategy, evaluation methods are used solely to help to rank projects prior to selection. Firms employing the technical strategy clearly base their decisions purely on the technical merit of the various projects put up for implementation.
The paper includes information on the types of selection method used, broken down by company size and other similar criteria, and comparisons with practice in the USA, France and some other countries.     

The Effects of Attitudes,Subjective Norms,Attributions, and Individualism–Collectivism on Managers’ Responses to Bribery in Organizations: Evidence from a Developing Nation

The goal of this study was to introduce a model explaining how managers’ attitudes, subjective norms, attributions, and the individualism–collectivism cultural dimension affect the way managers’ deal with employee bribery in organizations. Twenty-six internal and external attributions related to bribery were identified through a series of structured interviews with 65 subject matter experts. These attributions, together with the other variables in the model, were evaluated by 354 (n = 354) Ecuadorian managers. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that attitudes and external attributions significantly predicted managers’ intentions to discipline employees who accepted a bribe. In addition, external attributions mediated the relationship between individualism–collectivism and intent to discipline corrupt employees. Implications for the management of bribery in Latin American organizations are discussed.     

Firm size and productivity in Spain: a stochastic frontier analysis

This paper analyses the performance of the small and medium-sized manufacturing firms during the period 1995–2001, focusing on the degree of technical inefficiency and its determinants. We use a micro panel data set to simultaneously estimate a stochastic frontier production function and the inefficiency determinants using an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms. Our empirical results suggest that small and medium-sized firms tend to be less inefficient than the large firms are. Also, we centre our analysis in the effect on efficiency of some organisational factors related to the managerial ability to use and adjust capital and labour properly.

Takeover bids: evidence from the Portuguese market

Throughout the nineties, a number of tender offers occurred in the Portuguese market. This article employs event study methodology to investigate their effects on the involved firms shareholders. On average, these operations increased the market value of the involved firms by 2% to 3%. However, target shareholders appropriated most of this gain, earning 18% over their firms previous value, whereas bidder shareholders seem to have gained nothing. These averages bent in bidders shareholders favour, however, when bidders held significant positions in the targets capital before the bid.Received: December 2002, Accepted: September 2003, JEL Classification: G14, G34This paper corresponds to a revised version of chapter 6 of my PhD dissertation. I have greatly benefited from comments by my supervisors José Manuel Amado da Silva and Victor Mendes dos Santos, Pedro Pita Barros, participants in the 9^o Encontro Nacional de Economia Industrial and in an internal seminar at the Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, and two anonymous referees. The responsibility for any remaining errors is, of course, exclusively mine. CMVM and BDP have kindly provided the data used. Grant PRAXIS/PCSH/C/CEG/30/96 partially supported this research.     

现代各种不同的维修管理(续)

4．Campbell（1998）也构建了一个维修管理结构,如图2所示,维修管理方法,对每项资产必须从制订o fan战略开始,并允分地与业务计划相结合同时,初期与HR有关的各方面都很重要,并要求在化方面产生变化一其次,在整个寿命周期内,企业应该能控制增益和保证资产的生产率、这可以通过实施CMMS,维修功能测定系统,规划和计划各项维修活动等来做到。这可以按照不同的策略,根据这些资产对企业贡献的大小和风险程度来完成：在这些策略中,Campbell提出包括下列各项内容：①运行到失效为止;②增加备份装置;③按计划更换;④按计划大修理;⑤针对某一问题而进行的专项维修（ad hocmaintenance）;⑥预防维修（按使用年数或使用情况）;⑦状态维修（CBM）;⑧重新设计、     

CEO performance-based grants’ vesting provisions and debt contracts: Evidence from GAAP,Non-GAAP and KPI metrics

We examine the influence of CEOs’ equity and cash grants’ vesting provisions that are based on (i) accounting performance metrics prepared under US generally accepted principles (GAAP), (ii) non-GAAP performance metrics and (iii) key performance indicators (KPIs) on debt contracts. We find that grants with vesting provisions based on GAAP metrics and KPIs lead to a lower cost of debt, a lower likelihood of collateral requirements and less restrictive covenant terms. In contrast, performance-based grants with non-GAAP vesting provisions lead to a higher cost of debt, a higher likelihood of collateral requirements and more restrictive covenant terms. Supplementary analyses reveal that our results are incremental to other debtholder-friendly features in the CEO contracts, such as grants with debt-related performance measures and CEOs’ inside debt holdings, and robust to alternative variable definitions and specifications. Overall, our results suggest that debtholders understand the differing incentives associated with GAAP, non-GAAP and KPI-based performance measures, and incorporate these differences into debt contracts.     

Can income inequality promote democratization?

The aim of this paper is to study the effect of income inequality on the probability of democratization, in a panel of 51 transition countries during the period 1960–2008. Using a conditional fixed-effect logit estimation, we find robust results suggesting that income inequality (measured by the Gini index of household’s income inequality) has an inverse—U-shaped relation with the probability of transition from autarchy to democracy. We show that there is a turning point at a level of household’s income inequality equal to a Gini index of 40. When income inequality is below 40, then probability of transition is positively related to inequality, but when inequality is higher, a subsequent increase in inequality decreases the probability of democratization. This is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory that shows how transitions are likeliest at moderate levels of inequality, while autocracy is likelier at the lowest and highest levels of inequality.