Distinction or dichotomy: Rethinking the line between thymology and praxeology

The aim of this paper is to critically reexamine Ludwig Mises’ attempt to separate the psychological aspects of understanding (thymology) from the “science of action” (praxeology). There are, we contend, legitimate distinctions between theory, on the one hand, and, on the other, psychology or history. But, there is no need to dichotomize them from one another in the way Mises sometimes did.     

Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses

We consider the problem of dividing a resource among a group of agents who have conflicting claims on it. We follow the axiomatic approach and investigate the class of rules satisfying claims-inequality and claims-order preservation in gains and losses. We show that these axioms single out the proportional rule when there are more than three agents. This result confirms the central role of this rule and furthers our understanding of it in claims problems.     

Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (2) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (3) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case: a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.     

A dynamic two country Heckscher–Ohlin model with non-homothetic preferences

We examine the properties of a two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model that allows for preferences to be non-homothetic. We show that the model has a continuum of steady state equilibria under free trade, with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium will be attained. We establish conditions under which a static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem will hold in the steady state, and also conditions for a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem to hold. If both goods are normal, each country will have a unique autarkic steady state, and all steady state equilibria are saddle points. We also consider the case in which one good is inferior, and show that this can lead to multiple autarkic steady states, violations of the static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem in the steady state. Furthermore, there may exist steady state equilibria that Pareto dominate other steady states. These steady states will be unstable if discount factors are the same in each country, although they may exhibit dynamic indeterminacy if discount factors differ.     

Strategic approximations of discontinuous games

An infinite game is approximated by restricting the players to finite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximationof an infinite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose finite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the infinite game. We provide conditions under which infinite games admit strategic approximations.     

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

On the growth and welfare maximizing allocation of public investment

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long-run equilibrium and we derive the growth-maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth-maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). The empirical implication of the model is that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long-run growth rate are non-linear, following an inverse U-shaped pattern. Our analysis is completed by showing that the growth-maximizing shares of public investment and the growth-maximizing tax rate also maximize welfare in the decentralized economy.     

Compensating for unforeseeable damages in torts

The doctrine regarding unforeseeable damages in a contract was established in the well known case of Hadley vs. Baxendale. According to the judgement, a plaintiff cannot be compensated for unforeseeable damages in an incomplete contract unless he informs the defendant of the possible unforeseen contingency beforehand. In this paper, I extend the argument to the tort case in which it is hardly possible to communicate between a plaintiff and a defendant before an accident occurs. In the case of the sequential bilateral accident in which the victim’s care level is observable to the injurer, the victim’s care level can be a signal of the unforeseen contingency. I mainly discuss the implementability of the social optimum by the contributory negligence with dual standard of care enabling the communication between the parties.     

Effect of Diversity of Large Wildlife Species on Financial Benefits to Local Communities in Northwest Namibia

There exist few quantitative assessments of the relationship between biodiversity per se and economic benefits at scales that are relevant for conservation. Similarly, the merits of Community-Based Natural Resource Management programs for both wildlife and people are contested. Here, we harness two databases, on wildlife surveys and financial benefits, to address these issues for communal conservancies in northwest Namibia. We use ordination methods to characterize the diversity and stability of large wildlife assemblages on conservancies, and demonstrate that diversity (but not stability) is an important explanator of conservancy financial benefits. Our results indicate that for this area of Namibia, biodiversity, as represented by large wildlife assemblages, has an important, positive effect on the tangible financial benefits that people derive from conservation programs.     

Accounting for Spatial Effects in Economic Models of Land Use: Recent Developments and Challenges Ahead

The marked increase in the availability of spatial data has forced researchers engaged in land use modeling to directly confront the question of space and the theoretical and methodological challenges involved in developing spatial models. Advances have come from multiple disciplines, most notably through the development and application of spatial theory and methods from regional science, geography, urban economics and more recently, theoretical and applied econometrics. The main goal of this paper is to summarize the econometric challenges of spatial data and to highlight spatial models and methods with a particular focus on models of land markets and land use change. We also discuss the data and modeling challenges associated with modeling the underlying spatial economic mechanisms that give rise to land use patterns and the complexities involved in modeling land use as a coupled economic-ecological system.