The Aggregate Demand for Private Health Insurance Coverage in the United States

This article estimates the aggregate demand for private health insurance coverage in the United States using an error correction model for the period 1966–1999. Both short- and long-run price and income elasticities of demand are estimated. The empirical findings indicate that both private insurance enrollment and the completeness of insurance are relatively inelastic with respect to changes in price and income in the short and long run. Moreover, the results suggest that an increase in the number cyclically and frictionally uninsured generates less welfare loss than an increase in the number of structurally uninsured.     

Can Managers Successfully Time the Maturity Structure of Their Debt Issues?

This paper provides a rational explanation for the apparent ability of managers to successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. We show that a structural break in excess bond returns during the early 1980s generates a spurious correlation between the fraction of long‐term debt in total debt issues and future excess bond returns. Contrary to Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) , we show that the presence of structural breaks can lead to nonsense regressions, whether or not there is any small sample bias. Tests using firm‐level data further confirm that managers are unable to time the debt market successfully.     

Accounting for distress in bank mergers

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.     

Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden

Committees may make better monetary policy decisions than individuals; however, the benefits of group decision making could be lost if committee members cede power to a chairman. We develop an econometric model to describe intracommittee power‐sharing across members. Estimation of the model permits us to classify monetary policy committees into the typology developed by Blinder ( 2004 , 2007 ). We estimate our model for the United Kingdom's Bank of England (BOE) and Sweden's Riksbank. Results for the BOE suggest that the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank indicate that the Governor is highly influential.     

Some generalized distributions based on Stacy's generalized gamma distribution

Abstract

The generalized gamma distribution having the density function was introduced by Stacy (1962), who studied some of its properties. As observed by Stacy, many standard distributions are special cases of (1). For example d=p=1 gives the exponential, p=1 gives the gamma p=1 and d=n/2 (n is a positive integer) gives the chi-squared, and d=p gives the Weibull distribution. Furthermore, certain functions of a normal variable— viz., its positive even powers, its modulus, and all positive powers of its modulus, have Stacy's gamma form.